Major ethical positions regarding animals
Associated with: René Descartes
Applies to: All non-human animals.
Animals are soulless automata and require no ethical consideration; they can be regarded purely as property. Their status as objects makes their use no different from that of other inanimate objects.
Associated with: Immanuel Kant
Applies to: All non-human animals. They cannot use symbolic language and therefore are not rational moral agents.
Animals lack rationality, the test of moral concern. In that care should be taken regarding animals it should be indexed against animals that display human-like behaviours (e.g. the productive labour of a working animal). Cruelty to animals is ‘bad’ in that it promotes cruelty to humans.
Associated with: Various
Applies to: Varies depending on religion. Prohibitions on animal use may be temporal, i.e. applicable only on certain days or in certain contexts.
Animals are available for human use, within specified a priori limits derived from scripture.
Associated with: the critiques of Richard Ryder (who coined the term), Peter Singer (who elaborated)
Applies to: All non-human animals. Comparative moral worth is distributed arbitrarily and idiosyncratically.
A speciesist society is one in which the interests of humans are arbitrarily given higher value than that of animals, and which takes an ‘us and them’ approach to ethical decision-making. This preference for human interests is not based on a philosophical position, but on a prejudice in favour of one’s own species.
Associated with: Michael Leahy, Roger Scruton
Applies to: All animals. Comparative moral worth is determined through statute and relationships with individual human actors.
Humans are distinct from animals because language and society allow us to develop moral agency. Human interests have priority over the interests of animals, who are primitive beings. Animal welfare concerns reflect ‘natural impulses of affection and solidarity’, which are refined into statute and law through democratic processes and institutions. This process tests claims against the status quo, which is demonstrably right as it has survived political and legal challenge from outlier groups.
Associated with: Michael Pollan, Simon Fairlie
Applies to: All ‘higher’ animals. Comparative moral worth is determined by the extent of suffering experienced before use. Small farms are likely to deliver better welfare standards.
Humans are omnivores evolutionarily, biologically and culturally. Food norms have evolved to ensure health, environmental sustainability and social cohesion. Industrial food manufacturing undermines these norms. Understanding the origins of our food encourages more ethical choices, including when consuming animals.
Associated with: Rosalind Hursthouse
Applies to: All non-human animals. Comparative moral worth is avoided in exchange for a ‘common sense’ understanding of the differences between animals.
The treatment of animals should be based on consideration of what a ‘virtuous agent’ would do. Action should be taken according to the individual’s capacity to effect change.
Associated with: Nel Noddings
Applies to: All animals. Comparative moral worth is determined by the animal’s proximity to human carer(s) and its ability to form relationships.
Animals deserve care based on their proximity to, and relationships with, humans; within in these relationships between moral agents, our focus should be the wellbeing of care-givers and care-receivers. Animals without a relationship to humans have no moral status. Animal use is permissible.
Associated with: Carol Adams, Josephine Donovan
Applies to: All animals. Comparative moral worth should not be determined by similarity, but by weakness.
Humans already care about non-human animals, but the full manifestation of this care is often circumvented by social and economic forces. The use of animals is often associated with patriarchal power relations and ethical feminism would abstain from participation in these practices (e.g. meat eating) as part of a wider break with the practice and performance of male domination.
Associated with: Peter Singer
Applies to: All sentient animals. Comparative moral worth is determined by the capacity to suffer.
Animals deserve equal consideration of their welfare, but are different from people, particularly with regards to the capacity of humans to anticipate the future. Animals may, therefore, be subject to human use based on purely utilitarian calculations, as their capacity for suffering is often (but not always) less than that of humans. Suffering in animals, if mitigated, reduces humans’ moral concern for their life.
Associated with: Mary Ann Warren
Applies to: All animals. Comparative moral worth is determined by cognitive complexity.
Animals deserve protection, but are different from humans. The inappropriateness of mistreating animals is in direct relationship to their mental sophistication. Humans are fundamentally different from animals as humans exhibit complex rationality. Animals have some rights, not because they are moral agents but in order to interdict human mistreatment. Animals can be used, if they are treated humanely in the process.
Associated with: Tom Regan
Applies to: All sentient animals. Comparative moral worth is determined by the individual’s psychological identity and their future life opportunities.
Animals are ‘subjects of a life’ with intrinsic moral value irrespective of their capabilities. All subject of a life deserve respect (including freedom from harm) because they have complex psychological states (including emotions, beliefs and self-awareness). Choices may be made that privilege an individual or group over another based on the relative impact on their future opportunities, but only in rare cases. The systematic use of animals by people is unnecessary and should be abolished.
Associated with: Gary Francione
Applies to: All sentient animals. Moral worth is not based on similarity of sentience to humans.
A radical change in human behaviour is needed to abolish the use of animals by humans. Animal-welfare measures promote animal slavery by normalising the status of animals as property. The use or ‘ownership’ of animals by humans is not morally acceptable in any form.