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The essence of One Health, as described in Chapter 2, is the interdependence of human, animal, and environmental health. Greater recognition of these co-dependencies will ensure that interventions designed to protect health or mitigate disease threats in one sector will not have unintended or disproportionate adverse consequences for others. This interdependence raises ethical questions about how to balance competing values and priorities within and between different sectors.
Science can be described as a set of systematised approaches to understanding and predicting features of the universe, whereas ethics is a systematised approach to normative questions about how we should live our lives, and what we value and consider to be good and right. Science relies on theories to generate testable hypotheses. Ethics, similarly, has well-established theories that allow us to compare, explain and justify different approaches to normative questions, some of which we explore in this chapter. One Health draws on scientific methodologies and evidence, but it also has ethical dimensions. It assumes that health is a good thing and that understanding interactions between humans, animals, and the environment will help us to optimise the health of all, including maintaining and sustaining a flourishing ecology. Ethical and economic issues in One Health overlap but are distinct. Both employ theories of value to identify, analyse, and, potentially, justify people’s preferences. But, while economics typically measures the costs and benefits of different policies and actions in monetary terms, ethics evaluates them against normative standards (Anderson 1995). While the economic case for One Health has been repeatedly made (Häsler et al. 2012; World Bank 2010), literature about the urgent need for a One Health approach rarely mentions ethics (Degeling et al. 2015).
In this chapter we argue that One Health is necessarily a normative project. Describing infectious disease risks, such as antimicrobial resistance or the pandemic potential of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAI), as One Health ‘problems’ raises a normative question, since the term implies that these problems should concern us all, and that resolving them will provide a balanced One Health benefit and/or require some form of collective action. Such assertions appeal to community values – our shared beliefs about how the world should be, for us and for future generations. Ideas such as collaboration, sustainability and security are prominent in One Health discourse, but which community values are important to One Health and in which contexts they should apply have yet to be clearly articulated (Rock and Degeling 2015; Verweij and Bovenkerk 2016). One Health is gaining momentum as a global, scientific, and cross-sectoral approach to zoonotic disease, food security, and environmental degradation. The normative dimensions and implications are in urgent need of discussion and debate (Capps et al. 2015; Degeling et al. 2015).
Early work in One Health was oriented towards developing clinical solutions for endemic or emerging zoonotic diseases and risks. Technological responses were favoured because they promised substantial benefits without the need for revisionary thinking or major structural and socioeconomic reforms. Today, One Health (like its conceptual ally EcoHealth) increasingly recognises that zoonotic disease control programs are most effective when the broader socioeconomic and ecological determinants of health are included (Charron 2012; Zinsstag 2012). This greater emphasis on policies and programs enables assessment and mitigation of the risks of pathogen ‘spillovers’ between non-human and human populations (Dixon, Dar and Heymann 2014; McCloskey et al. 2014). This preventive approach to infectious disease control raises different moral concerns from those raised by clinically focused human and animal healthcare practices. The success of One Health interventions (Okello et al. 2014) is likely to be determined by the extent to which they reflect local circumstances and needs (Hinchliffe 2015) and the extent to which the people affected by them can be persuaded to accept the possibility of a personal cost in return for collective benefit. Limitations of freedom necessarily require consultation to determine which specific measures are legitimate in light of perceived conflicts of different interests between individuals, institutions and the broader community (Rock and Degeling 2015). Even if the proposed interventions are ethical, they are likely to be summarily rejected by stakeholders unless they are perceived to be fair, not disproportionately burdensome, and appropriately implemented.
Most human activities, social and physical conditions, policies, and decisions have the potential to impact on human, animal, and/or environmental health. Threats posed by endemic animal diseases and zoonotic risks are complex and driven by socioeconomic and sociopolitical factors; their consequences extend far beyond the immediate disease impact. One Health provides a context in which people, animals and their shared environments create and sustain their shared conditions for health; but this laudable goal might also provide grounds to intervene in almost every facet of human life. Expanding medical, biological, ecological and epidemiological knowledge has increased opportunities to create benefits and avoid harms to humans and non-human others by changing how we use and affect animal populations and ecological systems. How far should our individual and collective responsibility for the health of people, animals and environments extend? If One Health is potentially about everything, it may succumb to paralysis and inertia.
For One Health interventions to succeed they must address fundamental ethical questions about what is valuable, what is to be protected and, ultimately, what is dispensable. Public health ethics, a specialist field developed over the last 15 years, can contribute to answering these questions (Verweij and Bovenkerk 2016). Rather than seeking abstract universal truths, public health ethics is committed to the development of practical and just solutions informed by interdisciplinary research. One Health must be similarly oriented if it is to have substantive impact (Craddock and Hinchliffe 2015; Whittaker et al. 2015). Population health benefits are realised in One Health by focusing on interactions between populations within systems (Rock and Degeling 2016; Zinsstag et al. 2006). Public health ethics sees the health of population groups and communities as central to public policies that mediate individual and collective actions by promoting conditions that sustain human flourishing (Dawson and Verweij 2007). Public health ethics arguments can support and justify the types of sustainable collective action on which the success of a One Health approach depends.
One Health problems are ecological and political (Bardosh 2016; Hinchliffe 2015). Emerging and actual health risks at the human–animal–environment interface often result from human activities, especially changing land use, increasing global trade and travel, and intensifying animal husbandry practices that have adverse effects on biodiversity (Cascio et al. 2011; Greger 2007; Kilpatrick and Randolph 2012; Plowright et al. 2008). The impacts of zoonotic risks and outbreaks typically extend beyond the direct medical effects. Human–animal interdependencies sustain livelihoods for the vast majority of people worldwide who live rurally (Grace 2015; Perry and Grace 2009). Policies designed to protect human populations from zoonotic risks often disrupt fragile ecological systems, destroy livelihoods, and threaten food supplies (Coker et al. 2011; Otte, Nugent and McLeod 2004).
Below we demonstrate the profound social, cultural, and economic impacts of zoonotic disease by giving canonical examples of pandemic, food-borne, and/or endemic diseases. In this context, endemic and emerging zoonotic diseases are on a continuum; their categorisation reflects the microbiological, sociopolitical and geographic influences on disease transmission (Hooker, Degeling and Mason 2016; Wallace et al. 2015). Endemic zoonoses are found throughout the developing world, where they occasionally cause epidemics in human populations (Grace 2015; Maudlin, Eisler and Welburn 2009). Emerging and re-emerging zoonotic diseases, in contrast, are defined as zoonoses that have spilled over and are causing diseases in new locations and/or populations.
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a human respiratory infection, caused by a coronavirus carried by Chinese horseshoe bats (Wang et al. 2006). It was first reported in Asia in 2003 and within months had spread to 37 countries in the Americas, Europe, and Asia. More than 8,000 people were affected and 774 died from SARS, before it was eliminated by concerted international effort. The outbreak itself and the response to it, focused in Toronto, Singapore, Vietnam, Hong Kong, and mainland China, are estimated to have cost the Canadian and East-Asian economies more than US$200 billion (World Bank 2010).
Less prominent in the public imagination is variant Creutzfeld Jakob disease (vCJD)/ bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) (popularly known as ‘mad cow disease’). vCJD is a rare but fatal human neurodegenerative condition, caused by consumption of bovine products contaminated with the prions (proteinaceous infectious particles) that cause BSE. Person-to-person transmission can occur by blood transfusion (Davidson et al. 2014) and, potentially, organ/tissue transplantation (Molesworth et al. 2014). Since vCJD was first identified in 1996, 175 cases have been reported in the UK and 49 elsewhere. The World Bank estimates the direct costs of vCJD/BSE by 2018 to be more than US$11 billion, due to trade bans and other measures instituted to mitigate the risks of BSE resulting in losses to small agricultural businesses, rural communities, tourism and the pharmaceutical/blood product industry. With an estimated one in 4,000 UK residents carrying vCJD, the costs and burdens of contamination of human food supplies with BSE prions, will continue (Turner and Ludlam 2009).
Nipah virus (NiV) is spread from the East-Asian flying foxes into domestic pigs, humans, and other animals, causing respiratory disease and severe encephalitis. First recognised in Malaysia in 1998, it has spread to parts of South-East and South Asia (particularly Bangladesh). Of 522 proven human cases, more than 50 per cent have died (Field and Kung 2011). In 1999, NiV control programs devastated Malaysia’s pig industry and caused high unemployment and dislocation of rural populations, at a cost of more than US$1 billion to the national economy (Nor and Ong 2001). On top of the economic costs of control, more than 36,000 people in Malaysia lost their jobs because of the outbreak.
Global experience of SARS, vCJD, and NiV outbreaks demonstrates the enormous socioeconomic and cultural costs of controlling real and perceived human health risks from zoonotic pathogens (World Bank 2010; WHO 2004). While One Health approaches to zoonotic disease control appear to offer great promise, international experience shows that the effectiveness of any public policy depends on the effective implementation and alignment of the policy with stakeholder and public values, more than the conceptual frame or developmental process (Donaldson 2008; Selgelid 2005). In the case of BSE, early government decisions were dominated by powerful interests wanting to avoid public controversy and significant economic costs. Even when evidence of the link between BSE and vCJD became clear, feed bans continued to be poorly enforced and communication strategies were driven by the fear of irrational public panic and harm to farmers’ interests (Forbes 2004). More than half a million infected animals were estimated to have entered the food chain during this time. The ban on consumption of offal was progressively extended to more species and a broader age-range of animals (at slaughter). But the evidence for these measures was unclear, depriving the public of an accurate risk assessment and leaving them potentially exposed to BSE prions for far longer than necessary (Phillips, Bridgeman and Ferguson-Smith 2000).
The history of vCJD highlights the risk of public harm when there is a failure in policy development or a failure to enforce a policy expeditiously. Alternatively, the experience with the pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus, H5N1, in China and South-East Asia demonstrated that excessively zealous policy responses may also have adverse consequences. H5N1 was first identified in geese flocks in Guangdong Province, China, in 1994, with later outbreaks in poultry and associated human cases in Hong Kong in 1997; the appearance of H5N1 soon followed across Asia. In Vietnam alone, almost 40 million birds were culled in 2004 in an attempt to eradicate it (Rushton et al. 2005). Many of the birds were owned by large commercial operations, but the households of most rural smallholders and villagers in the developing world rely on small poultry flocks as a source of food, income, and insurance against unexpected expenses. The effects of potential HPAI exposure for smallholders were far more than a risk of infection (Sonaiya 2007). Mass culling may appear decisive, but it places an excessive burden on vulnerable ‘backyard’ farmers and, paradoxically, may promote the spread of the disease by pushing farmers to conceal sick birds (Alders et al. 2014; Sims 2007). It can also have serious, longstanding effects on the social and economic health of communities and on human wellbeing; for example, the increased incidence of childhood stunting in Egypt due to malnutrition following an outbreak of HPAI in 2006 (FAO 2009). These cases demonstrate that ethical policy development requires careful consideration of the potential consequences, rather than a ‘knee-jerk’ response to an immediate threat or sectional interests.
In biology, ‘endemic’ refers to a condition that remains relatively stable, in a defined geographical region, contrasting with ‘emerging’, which implies novelty and invasiveness. HPAI H5N1 is now endemic among poultry flocks in at least six countries (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2015) and has caused epidemics in others, including the USA. Newer strains of HPAI are creating havoc in the poultry industry in North America (Nonthabenjawan et al. 2016). Global health authorities have committed significant resources to monitoring avian influenza, because of its pandemic potential, but there have been only 852 confirmed cases and 456 deaths in humans since 2003 (until January 2017) (WHO 2017). Meanwhile, other endemic zoonoses, of far greater significance to human health and wellbeing, are tragically neglected.
Brucellosis is caused by bacterial pathogens belonging to several Brucella species that can be transferred to humans from infected cows, sheep, goats, and dogs. Human brucellosis is rarely fatal but causes symptoms, of variable severity, including undulating fever, fatigue, severe joint pain, neurological problems and ongoing debility (Rubach et al. 2013). Infection with Brucella spp. in domestic animals causes abortions and adversely affects herd health, agricultural productivity, and human nutrition. Because of this heavy burden of disease, brucellosis is consistently ranked among the most economically important zoonoses globally (Grace and Jones 2011; Perry and Grace 2009). High rates of human and animal brucellosis occur in tropical Africa and Asia. It is consistently under-reported, and there is a lack of effective control in most low-income countries, where its impact is borne largely by impoverished and marginalised communities (Halliday et al. 2015). Successful eradication measures used in high-income countries are not easily transferred to poor communities, where the monetary value of animals and animal products is lower. Livestock owners are less committed to control measures and less likely to be compensated, and the indirect economic impact of animal diseases is less. As a result, the socioeconomic and political focus is on more pressing needs and problems (McDermott, Grace and Zinsstag 2013).
Endemic zoonoses, such as brucellosis, echinococcosis (hydatid disease), cysticercosis, and anthrax, disproportionately affect poor, disadvantaged people in low-income countries by damaging their livelihoods and killing or lowering the productivity of their livestock. Endemic zoonoses also kill people. Rabies has been eradicated or controlled in much of the northern hemisphere, but remains endemic among dogs and is a leading cause of human mortality in Africa and Asia (Anderson and Shwiff 2015). When endemic zoonoses affect poor people they have less access to effective treatments and are less likely to withstand the socioeconomic burdens of serious illness (Maudlin, Eisler and Welburn 2009). The control of endemic zoonoses in low-income countries is essential for economic development and public health, but rarely a priority for international or national healthcare systems.
Against this background of under-reporting and inadequate funding, One Health practitioners focus on improving disease surveillance, risk communication, and public health programs, with the goal of controlling endemic zoonotic diseases in low-income settings (Perry and Grace 2009). The emergence of One Health programs in the last decade has highlighted how little has been done to combat human and animal health risks where longstanding disparities in resource allocation exist. The relatively few cases and deaths from H5N1 infections globally over 10 years, contrast starkly with the estimated 500,000 new cases of brucellosis and 59,000 deaths from rabies annually (Hampson et al. 2015; Pappas et al. 2006). Notwithstanding the evidence of global morbidity and mortality, most One Health policies and research agendas continue to be dominated by potential threats to global ‘security’ and the economy from zoonotic diseases with pandemic potential, while neglecting the actual physical, social, and economic burdens on the world’s poorest people (Chien 2013; Davies 2008; Halliday et al. 2015).
Endemic and emerging zoonotic diseases have major implications for the distribution of resources, access to healthcare, and regulation of health services. The examples described above demonstrate how policy responses to infectious disease threats are politicised and compromised by failure to address their sociocultural determinants and ethical impacts, and highlight the limitations of scientific and technocratic approaches to governance (Hinchliffe 2001; Hinchliffe et al. 2012).
Policy making in health, without reference to the relevant scientific evidence, would be perverse and dangerous; but so would policy making without explicit reference to ethical principles. Choosing one alternative action or policy over another (including doing nothing) is an ethical decision. Either maintaining the status quo or making an alternative decision affects the health of people, animals and their shared environments. The interests of industry and distant populations are often prioritised over vulnerable and less well-resourced communities; there is inadequate consideration of those at immediate risk from disease or those who bear the burden of measures designed to protect them (and, often, distant others) from risk. The incidence of zoonotic diseases in human populations is a key indicator of otherwise covert social structures and hierarchies that have become naturalised in infectious disease discourse and practice (Petersen and Lupton 1996). They show us the patterned effects of poverty, economic development, and environmental degradation (Bardosh 2016; Farmer 1996).
Ethics is a systematic philosophical approach to thinking about what is good and right in general (Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart 2013); applied ethics focuses on what we ought to do in response to specific situations, through systematic analysis of various possible options and their justifications. It is a fundamental tenet of ethical reasoning that, although we may disagree about what we should do, or even about what is good and right, it is possible to arrive at a justifiable answer to the question of what, practically, we can do. We argue that a modest form of pluralism (committed only to the view that there is more than one morally important value) can couple with common-sense decision-making based on discussion about relevant values (Grill and Dawson 2015). Values in ethics can be construed quite broadly, and can include honouring of duties to others, non-infringement of rights, and development and expression of virtues. In the less individualistic field of public health ethics, other values and goals are also important, such as solidarity, reciprocity, fairness, transparency, trust, community, as well as a complex set of considerations relating to common and public goods, shared resources, and social justice (Dawson 2011).
In the absence of an agreed set of relevant values in the One Health sphere, the values embodied in public health ethics are relevant, also, to One Health, since they are socially embedded, integrated, holistic and expressed as a human–animal–environment paradigm. Articulating relevant values can provoke disagreement or facilitate progress. A first step in reaching agreement is to understand the other’s point of view; our own views may change, suggesting new perspectives, situations and issues. The examples described above show that, when faced with a complex One Health problem, favouring or pursuing some values and goals at the expense of others can cause harms and conflicts between stakeholders. The key task of ethical analysis is to articulate these considerations before evaluating them.
Stakeholders are likely to be affected differently by any decision about One Health policies and practices because of their different concerns, interests and responsibilities. Consider HPAI in South-East Asia: backyard farmers have different interests from those of large agricultural companies; in the event of human transmission, the interests of local and remote consumers of poultry products and company shareholders will differ again. Enlarging our concerns beyond the health and wellbeing of humans, poultry kept for human use and wild bird populations, arguably, also have ethically relevant, but different, interests. Granting independent legal status to the Whanganui River in New Zealand is another example of the emerging recognition that protection of the interests of non-human entities might be central to the pursuit of environmental health and justice (Hsiao 2012; Vines, Bruce and Faunce 2013).
Externalising factors that cannot be measured in economic terms and relying on economic instruments such as cost-benefit analyses to guide actions does not take into account the stakeholder interests, concerns and responsibilities that need to be considered in decision making. These ethical considerations are often late additions to, or even left out of, the pursuit of policy options. If considered, they are typically conceptualised as constraints on the pursuit of predetermined goals (Grill and Dawson 2015). Ethical issues ought to be at the heart of formulations of what One Health is, what its goals should be, and how they should be pursued (Capps and Lederman 2015; Degeling, Lederman and Rock 2016; Scoones and Forster 2009).
The idea of freedom is central to modern liberal societies; usually understood as the freedom of individuals to do as they please unless there is significant (negative) impact on others. However, such freedom cannot be absolute. Sovereign states are free to pass laws – as part of legitimate democratic processes – that restrict the freedoms of legal persons (people and corporate entities). Such laws are usually justified in terms of public protection, especially of those vulnerable to harm. One Health (or indeed EcoHealth) interventions – such as prohibiting overfishing, stopping the felling of native forest to protect wildlife habitat, or regulating antimicrobial use in animal production systems – may be inconvenient, unwanted, or costly to some people or communities, but are deemed acceptable ‘all-things-considered’ if they are necessary to protect human or animal health or the essential ecological systems on which they depend. Not all limitations to personal or corporate freedom can be justified just because there is a collective or public interest at stake; the difficult issue is trying to determine which policies, laws, or regulations are justifiable. An appropriate One Health response should not immediately assume that restrictions of freedom are problematic, but should consider, objectively, the burdens and advantages that might arise. While an option may restrict freedom or financial benefit to some parties, it may also bring about greater equity or sustainability overall. One Health ethics requires consideration of the long-term impacts of an intervention on human, animal, and environmental health and their local priorities. It also needs to consider the influence of local and global power dynamics, history, and political economy (Bardosh 2016).
Such questions can be examined using ethical arguments to formulate goals, motivate action, and effect policy change. How to distribute harms, benefits, and goods of any proposed One Health intervention justly is a key ethical question. What counts as a relevant harm or benefit, and how to weigh one against the other, should be a primary consideration. Relevant harms and benefits are not just financial, but include the non-monetary effects of the disease and of measures to control and prevent it. Because One Health focuses on populations within larger systems, today’s actions will have direct effects on future outcomes. Consequently, the relevant harms of One Health policies and practices will include immediate and future costs and the cost of inaction (to lives and finances). Additional interrelated questions that require discussion include how to take into account future generations, whether future costs and benefits are discounted, and if so, by how much. Should we weigh the future health of ecological systems against the health and welfare of people living now? How do we balance the economic advantages of intensive agriculture with the risks of zoonotic disease emergence? People and institutions should not be judged for any apparent failure to act appropriately, without considering the social, economic, environmental and cultural structures that constrain and shape their actions (Giddens 1984; Hooker, Degeling and Mason 2016). One Health ethics requires that human health be placed within a broad ecological context.
At the heart of One Health is the recognition of a need to manage the risks of human–animal–environmental interdependencies in a new way. Some One Health challenges are the consequence of ethically problematic practices such as the structural legacies of colonialism, which treated livestock, wildlife, and the natural environment as exclusively economic assets (Anomaly 2015; Verweij and Bovenkerk 2016). The values encompassed by public health ethics will be useful, but their strongly humanist orientation is insufficient to guide ethical thinking about One Health (Verweij and Bovenkerk 2016); this requires a broader perspective, encompassing environmental and animal health and the sociocultural factors that affect them (Rock et al. 2009; Zinsstag et al. 2015). A One Health approach could potentially justify privileging non-human interests in some circumstances, with the presumptive aim of promoting mutual benefits to both humans and non-human animals (Capps and Lederman 2014; Rock and Degeling 2015). But significant differences still remain between One Health approaches that prioritise human interests and those seeking to protect the interests of, and distribute benefits to, non-humans. The interdependence of human, animal, and environmental systems means that ethical considerations about more-than-human collectives, logically, can be linked to concern for humans (Verweij and Bovenkerk 2016). Nevertheless, apparent inconsistencies and ambiguities in stated One Health objectives and our ethical concern for non-human others emphasises a need for review of the conditions under which we use and interact with other species – and any obligations that should follow (Capps et al. 2015; Rock and Degeling 2015).
One Health policies and practices require us to balance the needs of human individuals and populations with the health and wellbeing of non-human others and our shared ecological systems. An emerging focus in One Health programs and policies, converging in many ways with EcoHealth and planetary health, is the idea of ‘upstream’ prevention (Rüegg et al. 2017). In this context ‘prevention’ means more than reducing threats to human health. It requires conserving a healthy ecological state while maintaining a sustainable, secure food system that inhibits emergence of zoonotic risks and disease burdens, and depends on the co-ordinated activity of individuals and civil or government agencies. Any significant costs to industries, communities, or individuals will raise important justice issues between and within countries. However, the costs of any proposed changes based on One Health principles or broader sets of ecological or planetary concerns must be weighed against the costs of existing, unjust situations; there is no good argument for regarding the status quo as the natural state. Ethics can help to justify change and show that policies designed to reduce the burdens and threats of endemic and emerging zoonotic diseases, locally and internationally, must be part of a coherent global health strategy, for which individuals, populations, nation-states, and international organisations must share responsibility.
In proposing measures to control endemic zoonotic diseases, we must consider the effects of structural disadvantage and avoid the politics of blame. The traditional model of top–down policy making should be inverted so that the interests of those most affected directly influence policy prioritisation, formulation, and implementation. These issues are complex; universally accepted solutions are difficult, but this does not mean they should not be attempted. Public health ethics draws upon the resources of ethical and political theory and relevant empirical issues to formulate policy proposals. While it may be too early to give a full account of what One Health ethics ought to be, we can suggest areas to be explored in future. The core values of One Health and other holistic and ecologically oriented approaches are likely to correspond with those of public health ethics around concepts such as group/community/population, public goods/common goods, solidarity/reciprocity, welfare/wellbeing, and justice. This predominantly social focus need not mean ignoring individual concerns, or sacrificing individuals for the sake of human or non-human populations. The way forward is surely a rich, pluralistic account of One Health that eschews such dichotomous thinking and is sensitive to, and grounded in, the reality of social, political, and ecological relationships.
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