accountability, bureaucracy, centralisation, chain of delegation, Crown authority, executive, governor-general, ministerial responsibility, ministerial selection, parliamentary system, partisan, politically appointed staff, presidential system, prime minister, Prime Minister and Cabinet, principal–agent problem, responsible government, responsible party government, semi-parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism
The executive is one of the three branches of government, alongside the legislature and the judiciary. As the name suggests, its function is to execute laws and regulations. In Australia, the executive is the part of government containing the prime minister, Cabinet, ministerial offices and the head of state, the governor-general. Thus, while our first thought might be that the executive is ‘the prime minister’, it is in fact a collection of institutions that are bundled together, with complementary, and sometimes competing, responsibilities.
In a modern state, the ‘executive’ cannot govern alone – it is bound to other institutions. Depending on the exact nature of the regime (democratic/authoritarian or presidential/parliamentarian), the executive may be constrained by some institutions (e.g. the judiciary), dominant over others (e.g. the bureaucracy) and possibly even co-equal with some (e.g. the legislature in a presidential system). However, the principal relationship that defines how political scientists classify regimes is the executive–legislative relationship. In this chapter, we will first consider how executive regimes can be classified across the world and then examine Australia in depth.
Historically, executive power grew out of a monarch’s governing councils and the administrative machinery through which they ruled. We can still see evidence of this in the UK, where the lord chancellor – a role that was created 1,400 years ago to manage the monarch’s correspondence – was the name for the minister of justice until 2005. Different approaches to tradition and modernisation mean that the precise organisation of executives can be idiosyncratic, though there are broad patterns across different executive regimes.
In the modern world, monarchs have either been replaced by presidents (presidential regimes) or their powers have been displaced and taken up by parliaments (parliamentary regimes). Exactly how monarchical power was translated into modern (democratic) governance is important for how government institutions are organised and how decisions are made. These rules matter for how power is distributed across government and, in democracies, how citizens hold their governments to account.
In democracies, what makes presidential regimes distinct is the fact that the legislative and executive branches are separate and receive mandates through separate elections. Presidents are not directly accountable to their legislatures, nor do they sit within them. In turn, presidents have limited capacity to directly influence legislatures, just as legislatures have constrained capacities to limit the actions of presidents. Once elected, the president selects her executive, who will help to run her government; members of the executive are usually recruited from outside of the legislature. The president is also both the head of state and the head of government.1
By contrast, in parliamentary regimes only one mandate is sought from the people, when they elect the legislature. The executive (or just ‘the government’) is then formed from within this legislative pool. The party or coalition of parties that can command the greatest (or most stable) number of parliamentary seats has secured the ‘confidence’ of the chamber and forms the government. Members of the executive in parliamentary systems retain their positions in the legislature; they are both legislative representatives and ministers of state. They are able to directly influence, and even dominate, the workings of parliament. But they are also directly accountable to parliament. In fact, the (executive) government’s very survival rests on its ability to retain a majority (or confidence) within parliament. This distinguishes parliamentary regimes from presidential systems, in which a government cannot be dissolved with a legislative vote.
While prime ministers may be influential in the selection of ministers, they may not enjoy an absolute right of appointment. Instead, appointments depend on a combination of (1) convention, either within political regimes or parties, and/or (2) raw numbers, such as when a coalition of parties forms government and ministerial positions must be negotiated between partners. Finally, while the prime minister is the leader of the government in parliament, she is not the head of state.
To make matters more confusing, the executive–legislative systems of some countries are hybrids: either semi-presidential or semi-parliamentary systems.2 Semi-presidential systems (e.g. France) are similar to presidential systems, but with some parliamentary characteristics. The president and the legislature are separately elected, and the parliament appoints the prime minister. In this model, presidents and prime ministers share executive powers, and the actual practice of politics can be significantly shaped by whether or not the president’s party has a majority in the legislature.
Recently, some scholars have argued that we should recognise the existence of semi-parliamentary systems.3 Semi-parliamentary systems resemble parliamentary systems, but the way the legislature and the executive relate to each other means that the upper and lower chambers can pursue different democratic aims. Put another way, semi-parliamentary systems are executive–legislative systems where the legislature is divided into two equally legitimate parts, but the survival of the executive only depends upon the confidence of one part of the legislature. In Australia, only the lower house must supply confidence for the Cabinet. The Senate, which has near equal powers, can and does align itself to different democratic aims.4 This makes it different from parliamentary systems like the UK and Canada. It also may go some way to explaining why conflicts between the House and the Senate endlessly circle around whether or not the Senate’s use of its constitutional powers is legitimate. It is!5
In authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes, we may recognise the institutional features of the democratic executive–legislative regimes described above, but the essential practices, norms and beliefs that sustain them may be absent, changing the nature of governance again.
The fact that Australian states were British colonies ensured that the design of Australia’s executive governance was lifted from Westminster. The relationship between the executive and the legislature developed differently in England, compared with its main European rivals. England’s early development of a taxation system during the Hundred Years War (1337–1453) and the assertion by the lords of their rights in the Magna Carta (1215) meant that the English Crown could not ignore parliament as continental monarchs did. In fact, they needed parliament to pay for their armies. England’s adoption of Protestantism during the Reformation further empowered the parliament over the King’s other great rival for power, the church.
The tension between monarch and parliament became horrendously violent during the English Civil War (1642–51), and pressure again built up during the 1680s, resulting in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The Glorious Revolution saw a dramatic but peaceful rebalancing of power between the Crown and parliament within England, but led to wars in Ireland and later in Scotland. After the revolution, the monarch could not raise any taxes without parliamentary consent. Another unforeseen consequence of this revolution was that the heir to the British monarchy became the German elector of Hanover, George I. During the reign of the ‘foreign’ Hanoverians, the role of the monarch’s ‘minsters’ became ever more important. The effect was to entrench parliamentary government and slowly transfer the direct application of the monarch’s powers to his ministers, who ran his government. Yet this transfer was slow because the King and his aristocratic supporters retained control over access to parliamentary seats until successive democratic reforms during the 19th century. To this day, the Australian prime minister and the Australian government derive their authority from the Crown – it is Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II’s government.6
When the practice of ‘modern’ British government was first described in the 1860s by the English journalist Sir Walter Bagehot, he characterised the monarchy as the ‘dignified’ part of government and the exercise of partisan power in Cabinet as the ‘efficient’ part.7 Politics at the time was not dominated by political parties as we understand them today. Therefore, it was not uncommon for governments to collapse and new governments to form without an election. If a government should fall, it was the duty of the premier/prime minister to advise the monarch, or in Australia’s case the governor, who might be able to form another.
When the Australian colonies sought self-government in the 1850s, this meant ‘responsible government’ as practised in Westminster. Responsible government means that the executive must be formed from within the legislature and is responsible to the legislature. Responsibility is twofold: the executive (the government, or more specifically the Cabinet) is collectively responsible to the legislature and each individual minister is also responsible to the legislature. The implication is that if the executive loses the confidence of the legislature, it must resign. Losing the confidence of the parliament is not the same as losing a vote on a single piece of legislation. In that case, it would be up to the government to decide if it could reasonably continue or run the risk of a failed motion of no confidence. In contemporary Australian politics, this is rare because of party discipline and because governments have enjoyed majorities in the House of Representatives. However, the recent hung parliaments in 2010–13 and 2018–19 have demonstrated that this institutional design is still potent, despite decades of dormancy.
Modern Australia differs from the UK because at Federation the decision was made to borrow features from the USA and Switzerland. Australia not only became federal, it also became meaningfully bicameral, creating a very powerful second chamber, the Senate.8 These institutional differences have proven important for shaping how the executive relates to the legislature and what powers it can exercise. As noted, the Senate has near equal powers to the House. Since the mid-1960s, governments have had their legislative programs thwarted by the Senate and, more often, have been forced to adopt changes to their policy programs. However, loss of confidence by the Senate does not see the defeat of the government – the government rarely enjoys a majority in that chamber. This is because the executive is only responsible to, and must retain the confidence of, the House of Representatives. It is for this reason that some scholars argue that Australia is ‘semi-parliamentary’ or ‘not parliamentary’.9
The governor-general acts as the Queen’s representative in Australia, as outlined in sections 61 to 64 of the Constitution. The governor-general and her Executive Council appear both powerful and dominant. Indeed, you might be forgiven for thinking the governor-general is the most important institution in the Australian executive. After all, no election can be held and no law can come into force unless assented to by the governor-general. The governor-general also has the power to withdraw the commission and terminate appointment of the government – and Sir John Kerr did so in 1975. But, in practice, the post is largely ceremonial and ‘dignified’. The powers of Crown authority are now exercised by the prime minister and her Cabinet and, by convention, the governor-general is obliged to follow the advice of her ministers.
First among the monarch’s ministers, the prime minister is not mentioned in the Australian Constitution. The prime minister is the chief executive who leads the government in the executive and in the legislature. In the executive, the prime minister is the head of the Cabinet and can draw on the resources of her own department (Prime Minister and Cabinet [PMC]). Through her ministers, the prime minister is indirectly responsible for all the actions of her government. But, as we shall see, this principle doesn’t translate neatly into practice.10 Finally, prime ministers have the power to ask the governor-general to dissolve parliament, and in recent times prime ministers have asserted their power to declare war.
Today, the prime minister is also the leader of a formally organised political party and, by convention only, drawn from the House of Representatives. The evolution of political parties and their impact upon legislative politics has influenced the practice of the prime ministership. The prime minister has either large or total discretion in selecting her Cabinet and has the luxury of relying on strong party discipline when advancing her program in the legislature. Further, prime ministers will bring this partisan perspective, and their responsibilities as a partisan (party) leader, to virtually all aspects of the prime ministerial role.
We can see that the explicit power and, even more so, the potential influence of the prime minister extends from the executive and the bureaucracy to the legislature and to her own party. It is no surprise then that the role of the prime minister is poorly defined in Westminster systems like Australia. Few specific rules, laws or handbooks of practice have been written about the role. Instead, roles and responsibilities are in part a product of tradition and convention and in part a product of the prime minister’s own creativity. A prime minister’s capacity to exercise all of this power is influenced not only by the official rules, or even conventions, but also by other political actors’ perceptions of her power. Strong prime ministers may expand their role into new domains or appropriate powers to themselves that were previously executed by other ministers, actors or institutions. They can do this because the role is not codified and in circumstances where other actors’ perception of the prime minister’s personal authority is high enough to overcome internal resistance.
Since the late 1970s, there has been an ongoing debate about the nature of prime ministerial power. In Australia, as in other Westminster countries, much of this discussion has focused on the ‘presidentialisation’ of the prime ministership.11 Indeed, there is a growing discussion of the ‘presidentialisation of politics’ more generally.12 Presidentialisation is centralisation of power in the hands of prime ministers (or party leaders) and emphasis on leaders over ministerial (or party) teams. However, given what we have learnt about the nested nature of (semi‑)parliamentary executives, we might instead want to think about this puzzle in terms of what powers prime ministers actually exercise. If we compare prime ministers to presidents, we could conclude that even though presidents may have more formal (written down) powers, prime ministers in reality have more effective powers.13 After all, prime ministers are meaningfully influential across multiple government institutions. Presidents may wish they were prime ministers!
Cabinet originates from the King’s ‘Privy Council’, or private group of councillors. However, as parliamentary power asserted itself over the Crown, the King’s counsellors also had to hold a seat in one of the parliamentary chambers. At first, this was a useful means to exert direct influence over the parliament to ensure the ‘right’ outcome, but eventually it became an essential prerequisite for selection into the monarch’s ‘Cabinet’. The modern prime minister would be the most important of these monarchical advisers (Cabinet ministers), running the government on behalf of the Crown. Just like other political institutions Cabinet’s functions and relative importance have changed over time.
Cabinet is both an administrative and a partisan forum. This team of rivals (even enemies) is responsible to the parliament but also to their party room. A key principle of Cabinet government is collective decision making or ‘collective responsibility’. Cabinet is a deliberative body, where frank discussions about policy proposals, spending and administrative decisions and political strategies are undertaken.
As prime ministers have historically served at the pleasure of their parties, it is essential for prime ministers to meet with their colleagues frequently and for Cabinet to discuss the most difficult issues facing the government. Once a decision has been made by the Cabinet, all members agree to support the decision – this is known as ‘Cabinet solidarity’. In this sense, we might think of Cabinet as a ‘corporate person’ because it collectively comes to a decision and then speaks with one voice to the parliament and the people.
Cabinet makes up the most senior ministers that are responsible for executing government decisions. As the size of the state has expanded, so too has Cabinet. In Australia, both citizens’ increasing expectations of the services that the state ought to provide and the accrual of powers from state governments to the federal government has seen the expansion of the size of the federal Cabinet. We can observe this by considering the nine Cabinet portfolios from 1901, compared to the legal maximum of 30 (currently 23 in Cabinet, seven in the outer ministry) today (see Table 1).
Cabinet portfolios in 1901
Cabinet portfolios in 2019
Prime Minister and External Affairs
Trade and Customs
Minister without portfolio (×2)
Prime Minister; Public Service
Deputy Prime Minister; Infrastructure and Transport and Regional Development
Water Resources, Drought, Rural Finance, Natural Disaster and Emergency Management
Population, Cities and Urban Infrastructure
Foreign Affairs; Women
Trade, Tourism and Investment
Attorney-General; Industrial Relations
Communications, Cyber Safety and the Arts
Employment, Skills, Small and Family Business
Industry, Science and Technology
Resources and Northern Australia
Energy and Emissions Reduction
Families and Social Services
National Disability Insurance Scheme; Government Services
To encourage strong internal debate, but also to shield members of the Cabinet who disagree, all Cabinet deliberations are held in secret. It is for this reason that Cabinet leaks are considered so serious – they signal disloyal dissent from the heart of government. It is not the dissent that is disloyal, but the act of exposing private conversations, undermining the secrecy that keeps Cabinet debates robust. Indeed, members of the Cabinet that feel they cannot publically support the Cabinet’s collective decision must resign.14
Like several other aspects of Westminster executives, what happens in Cabinet is largely governed by convention. Prime ministers chair Cabinet and decide how it will function. Issues are placed on the agenda and submissions supporting or opposing a policy idea, spending proposal or line of political attack are circulated beforehand. Smaller subcommittees of Cabinet may also meet to deliberate on specific policy domains. Some of these smaller committees, such as the Expenditure Review Committee, make recommendations on spending in the budget and are consequently very powerful. Exactly how many and who sits on these smaller subcommittees is determined by prime ministerial discretion.15
Precisely how submission processes work and how the debate is conducted is subject to prime ministerial preference. It may seem trivial, but how easy it is to raise issues, how those conversations are controlled and how welcome discussion is has important implications for how decisions are made and their overall quality.
Australia has seen many Cabinet configurations and styles, which reflect the political principles of parties and the personalities of prime ministers. At the extremes, we have the Whitlam government’s (1972–75) inclusive but unruly 27-strong Cabinet. This oversized Cabinet was the product of Labor’s long years in opposition and reflected the party’s democratic ethos. But having so many people in the room added to the chaotic nature of that government’s administration. Another extreme relates to workload – Malcolm Fraser’s (1975–83) Cabinet undertook an exhaustive workload, considering a large number of matters without formal submissions. One of the reasons Fraser’s Cabinet spent so much time in debate was that ministers brought more matters to Cabinet for collective decision making, rather than making decisions themselves. By contrast, the Hawke Cabinet (1983–90) was known for its strong debating culture, and Hawke was considered a good chair.
As government has become more complex, the number of functions it undertakes has required more ministers (see Table 1). Menzies split the ministry into the Cabinet (12 members) and the outer ministry (10) by convention in 1956. Whitlam at first overturned this practice, but later formalised an ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ ministry because of the difficulties he faced in managing his oversized Cabinet. The Hawke government moved to a portfolio system, which made the executive more clearly hierarchical. Cabinet ministers would oversee large portfolio domains, like defence, and be assisted by outer (assistant) ministers who would have responsibility for a specific domain within the portfolio, such as veterans’ affairs. Several ministers could work within one portfolio because the prime minister would outline their specific responsibilities in charter letters. Outer ministers would only attend Cabinet when matters directly relating to their portfolio were discussed. Reforms in 1987 also added a third tier: parliamentary secretaries (junior ministers), who support ministers or the prime minister but are not formally sworn in.
Ministers are formally delegated power via the Crown in section 64 of the Constitution, but in practice via the prime minister. Ministers are responsible for making decisions and administering their departments. The functions ministers undertake are varied and include administrative and partisan aspects:
However, in contemporary politics, the prime minister is likely to have a significant influence over many of the functions listed. In complex policy areas, multiple ministers may try to co-ordinate their actions across government. Some functions of the executive are beyond the scope of a single minister, including:
Recall that under responsible government, ministers are individually responsible to parliament for the actions of their departments. Ministers may be subject to questioning in parliament, but this obligation does not extend to parliamentary secretaries. Ministers can also be held to account through parliamentary committee activities, statutory authorities such as the Australian National Audit Office, Freedom of Information requests and, in the most extreme cases, royal commissions. Should a minister lose the confidence of the House due to maladministration within her department, she may resign. Far worse is losing the confidence of her party room or her prime minister. In the best case scenario, a minister may be quietly eased out at the next Cabinet reshuffle; in the worst, she may face the ignominy of being sacked. Individual ministerial responsibility is a principle underpinned by norms and practised as convention, and is therefore open to interpretation. Further issues of accountability are discussed below.
Chief executives (in Australia, prime ministers) have a large say in ministerial selection, but they do operate under constraints. In Australia, the principal constraints on prime ministers relate to party and strategic considerations. In other executive–legislative regimes, constitutional considerations, such as the way prime ministers must negotiate appointments with presidents in semi-presidential systems, may also be important. Before the election of Kevin Rudd in 2007, Labor prime ministers were unable to directly select their ministry. Instead, Labor leaders had the power to allocate portfolios among candidates either elected by the caucus or approved by a smaller advisory committee. However, even where prime ministers enjoy full powers to hire ministers, they often consider representational constraints, such as state (well accommodated) and gender (poorly accommodated) balance. In Australia, party considerations include factional alignment and an appropriate balance between parties in a governing coalition. Strong party discipline, the role of factions, the small selection pool and the emphasis on relatively even state representation mean that Australian prime ministers are more heavily constrained than they appear at first glance.16
On face value, we might think that prime ministers only want the best performers as ministers. Yet, strategically, prime ministers need a mix of skills within Cabinet – some ministers to drive policy agendas, others who can act as steady hands. Then there are those who cannot be ignored because of their ambition or other party reasons, even if they lack the skills that make strong ministers. Some ministers may be appointed solely as a reward, to secure loyalty or to keep enemies under close observation.
A minister is a partisan and temporary head of department. Ministers only serve as long as the prime minister retains their services and their government survives. By contrast, the bureaucracy is the non-partisan and permanent institution that’s purpose is to serve the government by offering advice and transforming executive will into reality.
In short, ministers – the principal actors – delegate their authority to their bureaucracies – their agents. But, in practice, it is not that simple. The principal–agent problem between ministers (principals) and bureaucrats (agents) is one of information asymmetry. Even though ministers are in charge, the bureaucrats that serve them are often more expert and more experienced; through this information asymmetry, bureaucrats can have a greater influence on the eventual outcome.17 One reason for this is that opposition is only partial preparation for government, offering no experience in running a large organisation like a government department. In cases where information asymmetry is large and a minister is uncritical, that minister may even be considered ‘captured’ by the bureaucracy.
In Australia, the 1970s saw growing complaints by both major parties that the bureaucracy was insufficiently ‘responsive’ to the (partisan) needs of ministers. Similar complaints were repeated in other countries. Politicians identified two problems. First, governments felt that an overly powerful bureaucracy diluted ministers’ power to implement the political mandate they had secured at the election. Ministers were outnumbered in ministerial offices and lacked their own (partisan) sources of advice. Second, a non-partisan bureaucracy was poorly equipped to assist ministers with the political aspects of their job, such as advocating and overseeing the implementation of ideologically compatible policies.18
In 1972, Labor returned to power and appointed large numbers of political staff to support its ministers due to its long-running distrust of a bureaucracy that had served its opponents for 23 years without interruption. This practice was continued and expanded upon by the Fraser government and given legal form by the Hawke government in 1984.19
Today, Australia has around 450 political staff at the federal level. Political staff have become an institutionalised component of executive office. They offer both partisan and personal support to their ministers. Staff also support ministers’ executive function by undertaking overtly partisan policy work, such as agenda setting, bargaining and negotiating within government. They also undertake other policy work that overlaps with the roles of the minster and the bureaucracy, such as meeting with stakeholders and working with the bureaucracy to ‘deliver’ outcomes.20 However, political staff are not accountable in the same manner as ministers or senior public servants. They are not required to present themselves before parliament and cannot be called before parliamentary committees.
In recent times, there has been a growing debate about the decline of Cabinet government and the increasing dominance of the prime minister. Part of the debate is driven by the establishment and expansion of political institutions supporting the prime minister. In 1911, the PMC was established. However, PMC’s role was largely administrative until the prime ministership of John Gorton (1967–70). After this time, PMC developed the capacity to act as both a co-ordinator across government and a source of separate, and rival, departmental advice to the prime minister. The concurrent development of the prime minister’s personal office (PMO), which is by far the largest and best resourced, has also reinforced and extended existing information and power (hiring and firing) asymmetries between prime ministers and ministers.21
Access to advice and additional capacity for oversight has made it possible for prime ministers with high standing to dominate their governments. John Howard achieved dominance over his government through the skilful use of the resources of the PMO and PMC, in combination with his personal leadership qualities and style. Importantly, however, as government becomes more complex, there is growing need for oversight and co-ordination across departments. Given that ministers are responsible to the prime minister and that the prime minister is the head of the government, centralisation is a pragmatic response to the complexity of governing.
However, we should not make the mistake of crudely translating prime ministerial prerogative as strength. Consider the example of Kevin Rudd, who was able to dominate his Cabinet by usurping the right to hire and fire ministers from the caucus. Rudd attempted to centralise and control so many decisions that he was unable to effectively undertake the business of government. Key policy issues were left to drift and his colleagues began seeking the advice and help of his deputy, Julia Gillard. Ultimately, Rudd lost the confidence of his party room and was replaced, partially on the grounds that he was not running an effective Cabinet government. Rudd failed to use Cabinet as a robust and consultative forum.
Governance relies on delegation. In a (semi-)parliamentary democracy we can conceptualise delegation as shown in Figure 1. This is a simple model of delegation; the delegation of the authority to act passes from one principal (e.g. voters) to their agent (e.g. parliament). Functioning accountability measures are what distinguishes democracy from non-democratic forms of governance.
However, as we have already discovered, the actual practice of executive governance in Australia is more complicated. Agency problems arise across the chain of delegation. One of these problems may relate to a difference of preferences between principals and their agents; what voters want and what parliament legislates may be very different.
The other problem is the result of a lack of information on the part of the principal. This problem of information comes in two forms. The first is adverse selection, which relates directly to the quality of representation. Voters may not have access to enough information or the capacity to choose the representatives that will serve their interests best. Arguably, political parties, which act as interest aggregators, have helped resolve the issue of adverse selection by organising around a party label, which gives citizens ideological shortcuts to help them vote.
The second is moral hazard, where the principal lacks the means or information to keep their agents accountable and diligent. Party discipline has significantly diluted the ability of parliament to keep the executive accountable, particularly when an issue is not central to the survival of the government. However, Australia’s strong Senate, and its powerful committee system, does provide a legislative mechanism for executive accountability.22
Agency problems also play out at other stages of the chain of delegation. As we discussed above, the calculations a prime minister must make when selecting her Cabinet may not reflect her preferences, and ministers must work with a civil service that they are not always able to select.
As we have seen, prime ministers and ministers have developed new institutions – PMC and politically appointed staff – to help them to solve delegation problems between the prime minister and ministers, and between ministers and the bureaucracy. However, these new institutions have also complicated the chain of delegation and, in turn, the chain of accountability. Who is responsible in a complex policy area when something goes wrong? Given the size of government departments, with thousands of employees, at what point do ministers or even prime ministers become responsible if they know an issue has arisen? What is the precise role of politically appointed staff? To what extent can they speak for their minister and in what ways should they be subject to scrutiny?
In the last 30 years, these issues have concerned scholars and bureaucrats, who continue to debate whether or not Cabinet government still exists, whether the chain of accountability still functions appropriately given the new role of politically appointed staff and whether the balance between ministers, their staff and the bureaucracy is appropriate to achieve good government.23
Executive governance in Australia is a set of practices and norms supported by institutions both within and outside the executive. As we have seen, the executive is subject to the significant influence of political parties, both within the legislature and outside the official institutions of government. Outside elections, accountability to the party room may be more potent than accountability to the parliament. As outlined above, actors exercising executive roles are partisan, subject to party discipline and with their eyes always on the next election. Alongside the official rules and the unwritten conventions of their offices, these partisan considerations shape executive actors’ choices. Although we officially call our system ‘responsible government’, currently a better label is ‘responsible party government’ because power is interpreted and exercised through a party lens.24
Australia’s system of Cabinet government is flexible and open to interpretation. This has been its primary strength, allowing it to adapt to changing circumstances, such as the rise of parties, and respond to the needs of creative prime ministers through the creation of new institutions. However, it has also bred its own problems. These issues have come to the fore through inquiry along the accountability chain. The expansion of the committee system in parliament, the development of statutory authorities like the Australian National Audit Office, the creation of Freedom of Information laws and the debate around establishing a national integrity commission are just one set of responses to constraining executive power and keeping the executive accountable to citizens. As long as accountability remains a priority of our political system, this discussion will be ongoing.
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Dr Marija Taflaga is a lecturer at the Australian National University. Her primary research focus is Australian politics in comparative context, including political parties and parliament, the career paths of political elites and Australian political history. She has undertaken research fellowships at the Australian Parliamentary Library and the Australian Museum of Democracy at Old Parliament House. She has also worked in the Australian Parliamentary Press Gallery as a researcher for The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age.
1 Lijphart 1999.
2 Duverger 1980; Ganghof 2017.
3 Ganghof 2017.
4 Ganghof, Eppner and Pörschke 2018.
5 Taflaga 2018.
6 Norton 1981.
7 Bagehot 1963.
8 Galligan 1995.
9 Bach 2003.
10 Jennings 1966.
11 Kefford 2013.
12 Webb and Poguntke 2005.
13 Dowding 2013.
14 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2018.
15 Weller 2007.
16 Dowding and Lewis 2015.
17 The comedy classic Yes, Minister is replete with amusing examples of this problem.
18 Taflaga 2017.
19 Maley 2018.
20 Maley 2000.
21 Strangio, t’Hart and Walter 2017.
22 Strøm, Muller and Bergman 2003.
23 Podger 2007; Shergold 2007; Tiernan 2007; Weller 2003.
24 Lucy 1993.