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22 The Last Man: Literature and Survival
S’il y a un rapport entre écriture et passivité, c’est que l’une et l’autre supposent l’effacement, l’exténuation du sujet: supposent un changement de temps: supposent qu’entre être et ne pas être quelque chose qui ne s’accomplit pas arrive cependant comme étant depuis toujours déjà survenu – les désœuvrement du neutre, la rupture silencieuse du fragmentaire.1
If there is a relation between writing and passivity, it is because both assume the effacement, the extenuation of the subject: both assume a change in time, and that between being and non-being, something which never yet takes place happens nonetheless, as having long since already happened. The unworking of the neuter, the silent rupture of the fragmentary.2
Mary Shelley’s 1826 novel, The Last Man, tells the story of Lionel Verney, the survivor of a plague that has killed all humankind. Verney lives on in the libraries of Rome, dedicating himself to writing the history of the last man, a book addressed to the dead. Bruce Gardiner supervised my PhD, which read Shelley’s book, among others, in consideration of modes of first person narrative and practices of writing. This essay is a meditation on the dynamics of literature, reading and survival, dedicated to a literary and personal survivor.
Two scenes of writing, and of reading. The first scene (and sequence will be challenging in this context), is in a cave, that of the Cumaean Sibyl in a description that is presented as an introduction to the work that follows. The second scene (and ultimate beyond the usual sense of an ending or finality), is in a library, in Rome, and comes at the climax of the novel.
So, to the first scene.
The “Author’s Introduction” to The Last Man, while clearly an introduction, is not so clearly the account of an “author”. Notions of authorship are complicated by a discourse that opens with an account of a visit to the Bay of Naples and the Baiae in December 1818:
I visited Naples in the year 1818. On the 8th of December of that year, my companion and I crossed the Bay, to visit the antiquities which are scattered on the shores of Baiae.3
This account is to be contrasted with the impressions of this visit recorded in Mary’s Journal:
Tuesday, Dec. 8. – Go on the sea with Shelley. Visit Cape Miseno, the Elysian Fields, Avernus, Solfatara. The Bay of Baiae is beautiful; but we are disappointed by the various places we visit.4
The fact that this is all that is recorded there about this journey effectively functions to distance the more elaborate account of the “Introduction” from any relation to the events of December 1818, from History and from a Mary Shelley as Historical and Authorial Subject. However, at first the “Introduction’s” account concurs with the Journal:
We visited the so called Elysian Fields and Avernus: and wandered through various ruined temples, baths, and classic spots; at length we entered the gloomy cavern of the Cumaean Sibyl. Our Lazzeroni bore flaring torches, which shone red, and almost dusky, in the murky subterranean passages, whose darkness thirstily surrounding them, seemed eager to imbibe more and more of the element of light. We passed by a natural archway, leading to a second gallery, and enquired, if we could not enter there also. The guides pointed to the reflection of their torches on the water that paved it, leaving us to form our own conclusion; but adding it was a pity, for it led to the Sibyl’s Cave. Our curiosity and enthusiasm were excited by this circumstance, and we insisted upon attempting the passage. As is usually the case in the prosecution of such enterprizes, the difficulties decreased on examination. We found, on each side of the humid pathway, “dry land for the sole of the foot.” At length we arrived at a large, desert, dark cavern, which the Lazzeroni assured us was the Sibyl’s Cave. We were sufficiently disappointed —5
The account breaks off with a dash, and this is the point at which the “Introduction” is most in accord with the Journal account, in the noting of the disappointment the unnamed “Mary” and “Percy” felt in this place. The divergence between the two accounts then opens at exactly this point of identity and, following the dash, the account opens up the question of the processes of writing-reading in a certain allegorical mode – one that is itself involved in the oracular and apocalyptic genres – for what is figured here is a revelation of the oracular, apocalyptic texts that will then be the texts revealed in The Last Man, a text that will reveal the End of Man to come two centuries later, an Apocalypse Not Now, Not Yet.6 There will be a revelation of the mode in which these revelations, apocalypses may be inscribed or intoned, a revelation of an answer to the question of the place of the writer, here a writer of the female gender operating within the bounds of late romanticism: within the closure of that romanticism, but at its limen, its threshold. The revelation, then, of how one may write at the End, of what can be written of the End.
After the dash – the account proceeds –
Yet we examined it with care, as if its blank, rocky walls could still bear trace of celestial visitant. On one side there was a small opening. Whither does this lead? we asked: can we enter here? – “Questo poi, no,”7 said the wild looking savage who held the torch; “you can advance but a short distance, and nobody visits it.”8
The travellers then proceed through a number of narrow and difficult passages, finally reaching another cave, containing a raised stone seat and the “perfect snow-white skeleton of a goat”, which has apparently fallen through the veiled aperture in the roof of the cavern. Mary Shelley continues this account by mentioning the other adornments of this space:
The rest of the furniture of the cavern consisted of piles of leaves, fragments of bark, and a white filmy substance, resembling the inner part of the green hood which shelters the grain of the unripe Indian corn.9
So far, then, there is a succumbing to enthusiasm which leads to a further investigation of the passage leading to a second cavern – which is supposed to be the Sibyl’s Cave and isn’t – and then the investigation and penetration of another series of passages to the third cavern, one veiled by nature, containing leaves, bark, and corn hoods. Now the identity of this last cavern is revealed:
At length my friend, who had taken up some of the leaves strewed about, exclaimed, “This is the Sibyl’s Cave; these are Sibylline leaves.” On examination, we found that all the leaves, bark, and other substances, were traced with written characters. What appeared to us more astonishing, was that these writings were expressed in various languages: some unknown to my companion, ancient Chaldee, and Egyptian hieroglyphics, old as the Pyramids. Stranger still, some were in modern dialects, English and Italian. We could make out little by the dim light, but they seemed to contain prophecies, detailed relations of events but lately passed; names, now well known, but of modern date; and often exclamations of exultation or woe, of victory or defeat, were traced on their scant pages. This was certainly the Sibyl’s Cave; not indeed exactly as Vergil describes it; but the whole of this land had been so thoroughly convulsed by earthquake and volcano, that the change was not wonderful though the traces of ruin were effaced by time; and we probably owed the preservation of these leaves, to the accident which had closed the mouth of the cavern, and the swift-growing vegetation which had rendered its sole opening impervious to the storm. We made a hasty selection of such of the leaves, whose writing one at least of us could understand; and then, laden with our treasure, we bade adieu to the dim hypaethric cavern, and after much difficulty succeeded in rejoining our guides.
During our stay in Naples, we often returned to this cave, sometimes alone, skimming the sun-lit sea, and each time added to our store. Since that period, whenever the world’s circumstance has not imperiously called me away, or the temper of my mind impeded such study, I have been employed in deciphering these sacred remains.10
Thus, the “real” cave, the last cave, of the Cumaean Sibyl is revealed, its veil undercut: a veiling previously made complete by nature after a moment of the “catastrophe” of the fall of the goat, but which is now rent again and revealed by enthusiasm, rather appropriately given that it is a Sibylline cave. Therein, the texts of various voices delivered through the Sibyl lie, texts ranging across History as the oracular utterances are fabled to have done, texts of voices requiring reinscription: requiring a Sibyl to render them intelligible again. Or for the first time. These are texts or voices whose origins it would be better for us not to inquire after; whose multiplicity and multivalency will intone the death knell of certain rules of discourse, and of concepts of an author, intoning a death knell for certain orders of Literature and Philosophy.
This “Author’s Introduction” to The Last Man breaks the oracular mode free from the constraints of unintelligibility, and of the hermeneutic constraint which requires a translator for oracles and apocalyptic texts: a constraint no less incumbent upon masculine writers of apocalyptic texts than upon feminine writers, as indicated by the critical history of commentaries upon John of Patmos’ Apocalypse.11 Where previously the oracular-oneiric or apocalyptic text required a masculine translator-priest for its intelligible inscription, this task now becomes a feminine one and, in terms of the structure of this sexual-hermeneutic economy, thus one belonging to the Sibyl herself.
I present the public with my latest discoveries in the slight Sibylline pages. Scattered and unconnected as they were, I have been obliged to add links, and model the work into a consistent form. But the main substance rests on the truths contained in these poetic rhapsodies, and the divine intuition which the Cumaean damsel obtained from heaven.
I have often wondered at the subject of her verses, and at the English dress of the Latin poet. Sometimes I have thought, that, obscure and chaotic as they are, they owe their present form to me, their decipherer. As if we should give to another artist, the painted fragments which form the mosaic copy of Raphael’s Transfiguration in St. Peter’s; he would put them together in a form, whose mode would be fashioned by his own peculiar mind and talent. Doubtless the leaves of the Cumaean Sibyl have suffered distortion and diminution of interest and excellence in my hands. My only excuse for thus transforming them, is that they were unintelligible in their pristine condition.
My labours have cheered long hours of solitude, and taken me out of a world, which has averted its once benignant face from me, to one glowing with imagination and power. Will my readers ask how I could find solace from the narration of misery and woeful change? This is one of the mysteries of our nature, which holds full sway over me, and from whose influence I cannot escape. I confess, that I have not been unmoved by the development of the tale; and that I have been depressed, nay, agonized, at some parts of the recital, which I have faithfully transcribed from my materials. Yet such is human nature, that the excitement of mind was dear to me, and that the imagination, painter of tempest and earthquake, or, worse, the stormy and ruin-fraught passions of man, softened my real sorrows and endless regrets, by clothing these fictitious ones in that ideality, which takes the mortal sting from pain.
I hardly know whether this apology is necessary. For the merits of my adaptation and translation must decide how far I have well bestowed my time and imperfect powers, in giving form and substance to the frail and attenuated Leaves of the Sibyl.12
Two points here: one, on the process of writing as transcription and decipherment; the other, on the consolations of the imagination of disaster. When Mary Shelley writes that “Yet such is human nature, that the excitement of mind was dear to me, and that the imagination, painter of tempest and earthquake, or, worse, the stormy and ruin-fraught passions of man, softened my real sorrows and endless regrets, by clothing these fictitious ones in that ideality, which takes the mortal sting from pain”, she can be understood as stating that the thought of the death of all humanity offered solace for her loss of Percy Shelley, found in the process of writing (or transcribing) the Sibylline texts.
A play occurs here between the terms used to describe the appearance of this oracular text, its phenomenal appearance in the world as text, a movement between terming it a product of the revelation of the “divine intuition” of the Sibyl – implicitly linking it to a theory of genius and imagination – and terming the text a work of decipherment and translation, a work reading these texts and making them intelligible, legible. At first, the text is an inscription of certain “discoveries” in the Sibylline pages, resting upon them and upon “intuition”. Then, it appears that there has been a “transformation” of those pages and not simply a decipherment, and this text finally appears as an “adaptation and translation” giving “form and substance” to those leaves and pages. There is also the matter – involving a theory of poetry and genre – of the transformation of verse into prose, one bound to retain the poetic quality of verse expression in the guise of unmetered language.
The fact that this priestly function of interpretation and decipherment is discharged by a female and feminine writer – one who thus shares some sexual identity with the Sibyl – raises a number of questions concerning the implications of this shift upon sexual-hermeneutic economies: does Mary Shelley become a “drag-priest”, and what are the implications of such a discursive transvestism for writing-reading and Philosophy?13 Does this conflation of roles put into question the categories of writer/decipherer, even announcing the Death of the Hermeneut?
This “Author’s Introduction” is, then, an account of certain apocalypses leading to the genesis of an apocalyptic-eschatological text in which there is a concurrence, between and in the various shifts in the description of the inscriptive/hermeneutic operations occurring here – of the revelation of text(s) and the text(s) of revelation – a concurrence complicit with an activity of translation. An account in which an extreme position with regard to generic orders and laws of inscription is delineated: neither a text of direct experience, nor of personal vision, rather a hybrid of these, with all the hermaphroditism of hybrids.
After the introduction, the novel begins. It is a first person narrative featuring Lionel Verney, a native of the British Isles, and is set in the late twenty-first century. It conjures a future barely different to the early nineteenth century, and hardly marked by the industrialisation which was occurring as it was written. Presciently, the throne is held by the House of Windsor, and balloon travel is the greatest advance on coaches and boats. Spread over three volumes, the narrative is far less remarkable than its framing: both the opening in the Sibyl’s cave, and its ending in a deserted Rome. The major action involves a “PLAGUE” which sweeps through Europe from the Orient, and eludes the measures of medical science. Eventually, it kills all of humanity: Verney contracts the plague, but survives it, as an apparently sole survivor. In one of the many unexplained aspects of the plague’s action, Verney wanders a depopulated Europe without encountering corpses: the dead apparently burying themselves, or vanishing.
He eventually arrives in Rome, where he spends time in its libraries, seeking solace from his sense of devastation after the loss of all his friends and family.
I endeavoured to read. I visited the libraries of Rome. I selected a volume, and, choosing some sequestered, shady nook, on the banks of the Tiber, or opposite the fair temple in the Borghese Gardens, or under the old pyramid of Cestius, I endeavoured to conceal me from myself, and immerse myself in the subject traced on the pages before me. As if in the same soil you plant nightshade and a myrtle tree, they will each appropriate the mould, moisture, and air administered, for the fostering their several properties – so did my grief find sustenance, and power of existence, and growth, in what else had been divine manna, to feed radiant meditation.14
As a complement to the extreme position taken up in the “Author’s Introduction”, The Last Man takes up an extreme position as concerns Man and History in being the narrative of the LAST MAN, Lionel Verney: an exile from humanity and its History (and even from death). Its position of extremity is in being at the limits in a liminal position with regard to certain categories but yet included within them and bounded by them. Recalling Nietzsche’s narrative of the letzten Philosophen, Verney’s narrative is begun in Rome amidst the death of humanity from a strange PLAGUE, and the beginning gesture of this tale that is to become The Last Man – before any of these “events” occur – one recorded late in the tale’s narrative order, is as follows:
I was presented, meantime, with one other occupation, the one best fitted to discipline my melancholy thoughts, which strayed backwards, over many a ruin, and through many a flowery glade, even to the mountain recess, from which in early youth I had first emerged.
During one of my rambles through the habitations of Rome, I found writing materials on a table in an author’s study. Parts of a manuscript lay scattered about. It contained a learned disquisition on the Italian language; one page an unfinished dedication to posterity, for whose profit the writer had sifted and selected the niceties of this harmonious language – to whose everlasting benefit he bequeathed his labours.
I will also write a book, I cried – for whom to read? – to whom dedicated? And then with a silly flourish (what so capricious and childish as despair?) I wrote,
DEDICATION
TO THE ILLUSTRIOUS DEAD.
SHADOWS, ARISE, AND READ YOUR FALL!
BEHOLD THE HISTORY OF THE
LAST MAN.15
The logical problems and paradoxes of this inscription encapsulate the problems of the apocalyptic genre in general, particularly the temporal paradoxes involved: a text written at the End of History that is yet a self-proclaimed “HISTORY OF THE LAST MAN”, dedicated to the dead, and without a reader other than its “author” – underlining the conflation of reading and writing in this text.
It also returns us to the “Author’s Introduction”, as writing occurs as both solace in loss, and as an activity of taking up discarded texts.
It is an extraordinarily striking and melancholic scenario, and prefigures Friedrich Nietzsche’s reflections on the same trope in the figure of the last Philosopher, as a “Geschichte der Nachwelt” (“History of Posterity”).
Ödipus.
Reden des letzten Philosophen mit sich selbst.
Ein fragment aus der Geschichte der Nachwelt.
Den letzten Philosophen nenne ich mich, denn ich bin der letzte Mensch. Niemand redet mir als ich selbst, und meine Stimme kommt wid die eines Sterbenden zu mir! Mit dir, dem letzten Errinerungshauch alles Menschenglücks, laß mich nur eine Stundenoch verkehren, durch dich täusche ich mir die Einsamkeit hinweg und lüge mich in die Vielheit und die Liebe hinein, denn mein Herz sträubt sich zu glauben, daß die Liebe todt sei, es ertägt den Schauder der einsamsten Einsamkeit nicht und zwingst mich zu reden, als ob ich Zwei wäre.
Höre ich dich noch, mein Stimme Du flücherst, indem du fluchst? Und doch sollte dein Fluch die Eingeweide dieser Welt zerbersten machen! Aber sie lebt noch und schaut mich nur noch glänzender und kälter mit ihren mitleidslosen Sternen an, sie lebt, so dumm und blind wie je vorher, un nur einer stirbt, der Mensch.16
Oedipus.
Discourse of the last Philosopher with himself.
A Fragment from the History of Posterity.
I call myself the last Philosopher, because I am the last man. No one speaks with me but myself, and my voice comes to me like the voice of a dying man! Let me associate for but one hour more with you, dear voice, with you, the last trace of the memory of all human happiness. With you I escape loneliness through self-delusion and lie myself into multiplicity and love. For my heart resists the belief that love is dead. It cannot bear the shudder of the loneliest loneliness, and so it forces me to speak as if I were two persons.
Do I still hear you, my voice? Are you whispering as you curse? And yet your curses should cause the bowels of this earth to burst open! But the world continues to live and only stares at me even more glitteringly and coldly with its pitiless stars. It continues to live as dumbly and blindly as ever, and only one thing dies, Man.17
A discourse of the last man with himself, couched in the form of a fragment from a future history of posterity: this is an impossible discourse which fragments History, and has an eccentric relation to philosophic discourse. It raises the question of the discursive possibility of both History and Philosophy, of their laws of genre and generation. Nietzsche’s schema perfectly fits The Last Man and the genre of the apocalyptic – a genre of texts with the project of a revelation of the last, the end. In its paradox, it shows the tenacious logic that if someone is talking to me (even if it is myself), I am not yet alone. For Shelley and Verney, if they are writing, then there is always the possibility of a reader, of another survivor to witness their survival.
Both Verney’s Rome, and Nietzsche’s “fragment from the history of posterity” share a scene of devastation in which loneliness is escaped through a self-delusion that opens up an impossible dialogue. For Nietzsche, this dialogue is at the end point of Philosophy, understood as a discourse involving a certain conception of humanity, which is said to have died while the world continues to live. It is a death on the other side of the pursuit of knowledge, which Nietzsche had analysed as being a dangerous encounter with dispelling all that kept humanity alive: a protective form of ignorance.18
For Mary Shelley or Lionel Verney, literature – its reading, its writing – offers a form of survival, in the face of bereavement and devastation. Literature becomes a mode of living on, for both the survivors and the dead, even a literature that imagines the death of all as solace for the death of a few.
As noted in the epigraph from Maurice Blanchot, the writing of the disaster is structured by temporal rupture, and the effacement of the subject. As he puts it: “something which never yet takes place happens nonetheless, as having long since already happened”, which he claims inheres in the relation between writing and passivity.
Familiarly, passivity is more associated with reading than with writing. Mary Shelley – in her “Author’s Introduction” to The Last Man as well as in her more famous 1831 Preface to Frankenstein; Or The Modern Prometheus – positions writing as a form of reading, and as a product of the unknown known. Writing after The Last Man, Mary Shelley enlarges on the ghost story competition in the Byron–Shelley circle which led to Frankenstein, and Mary commences the account of her contribution as follows:
I busied myself to think of a story – a story to rival those which had excited us to this task. One which would speak to the mysterious fears of our nature and awaken thrilling horror – one to make the reader dread to look round, to curdle the blood, and quicken the beatings of the heart. ... I thought and pondered – vainly. I felt that blank incapability of invention which is the greatest misery of authorship, when dull Nothing replies to our anxious invocations. “Have you thought of a story?” I was asked each morning, and each morning I was forced to reply with a mortifying negative.19
Thought is figured as being unproductive, a vain resource, particularly in terms of the writing of a story defined as speaking “to the mysterious fears of our nature”. Thought having failed, there is an invocation – the voice’s calling – of invention, with all its appropriate religious and oracular associations.
Mary Shelley then goes on to relate conversations between Byron and Percy Shelley concerning the principle of life and the possibility of reanimation, “to which I was a devout but nearly silent listener”, and then narrates the night of her dream:
Night waned upon this talk, and even the witching hour had gone by before we retired to rest. When I placed my head on my pillow, I did not sleep, nor could I be said to think. My imagination, unbidden, possessed and guided me, gifting the successive images that arose in my mind with a vividness far beyond the usual bounds of reverie. I saw – with shut eyes, but acute mental vision – I saw the pale student of the hallowed arts kneeling beside the thing he had put together. I saw the hideous phantasm of a man stretched out, and then, on the working of some powerful engine, show signs of life, and stir with an uneasy, half-vital motion. Frightful it must be; for supremely frightful would be the effect of any human endeavour to mock the stupendous mechanism of the Creator of the world.20
Almost as if in a riposte to Keats’ question “Do I wake or sleep?” Mary Shelley writes that she does neither: “I did not sleep, nor could I be said to think.” Imagination possesses the writer as if in a dream, but this reverie is already beyond itself: it is “far beyond the usual bounds of reverie”. What is also beyond those “usual bounds” is the subject of those images itself: the “hideous phantasm”. Haunting Mary’s vision is a process of abjection: her vision comes to her in an abject manner with an image of an abject creation.
Like a Sibyl, the writer “sees” with her eyes closed, “seeing” beyond the bounds of what may normally be seen: she “sees” that which would mock God, and in this, that which would be “supremely frightful”. The “stupendous mechanism of the Creator of the world”, then, will not only be Man but also the system of concealment in which the Creator is figured, since the creation of Life and Man is the point at which the Creator is created as Creator. And this will be borne out in the various interchanges in the narrative between the roles of Creator/created, organised around readings of the Promethean myth and the Miltonic-Satanic myth: both Victor and the creature take on the roles of Creator and Man in relation to their contestation of the poles of a Master/Slave dialectic.
Yet, to return to the question of thought versus dream, there is a certain slippage in the difference between thought and non-thought argued here: not only are the usual bounds of reverie exceeded here, but also the difference – sketched by Mary Shelley – between what can be said to be “thought” (attached to some notion of will and voluntarism, such that it is solely an active process), and what is presented as other than thought. A slippage constituting the laws governing what may be thought, and how thought appears in writing. Further, a slippage legislating for the area whose bounds are exceeded: in this case, reverie. At first, “imagination” is used to distinguish this non-thought, but Mary will later announce that she “had thought of a story”. She will also describe the product of her vision as an “idea”:
The idea so possessed my mind that a thrill of fear ran through me, and I wished to exchange the ghastly image of my fancy for the realities around. I see them still: the very room, the dark parquet, the closed shutters with the moonlight struggling through, and the sense I had that the glassy lake and white high Alps were beyond. I could not so easily get rid of my hideous phantom; still it haunted me. I must try to think of something else. I recurred to my ghost story – My tiresome, unlucky ghost story! Oh! If I could only contrive one which would frighten my reader as I myself had been frightened that night!
Swift as light and as cheering was the idea that broke in upon me. “I have found it! What terrified me will terrify others; and I need only describe the spectre which had haunted my midnight pillow.” On the morrow I announced that I had thought of a story.21
Again, there is a recurrence of the structure that might be referred to as the unknown-known, as writing-reading more than one knows. Before Mary knows it, before it has entered the realm or bounds of thought, she has solved the problem of the ghost story, but she does not realise this at first. The story – what she knows but does not know – haunts her. And, when she announces that she has thought of a story, a passage from a realm outside “thought” – from non-thought to thought – may be identified. In this passage the story traverses the distance between thought and its other, the story/idea has come forth into thought and into the world, but only after it had come to mind.
Thoughts unbidden, texts found, deciphered, transcribed and transposed: these are modes of reading and writing that are modest about claims of originality, and careful to preserve and cherish a wider body of literature. From the Sibyl’s cave to the libraries of Rome, the reader and writer still proceeds with care.
Now, let us imagine the last Academic. A survivor, of plagues both literal and figurative, of the changing histories and practices of university teaching, research and administration. A person of modesty, and meticulousness, committed to reading and teaching as critical acts, a commitment borne with generosity and dedication.
Blanchot, Maurice. L’écriture du désastre. Paris: Gallimard, 1980.
Blanchot, Maurice. The Writing of the Disaster. Trans. Ann Smock. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986.
Derrida, Jacques. “No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives).” Trans. Catherine Porter and Philip Lewis, Diacritics 14 no.2 (Summer 1984), 20–31.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Das Philosophenbuch [1872–73/75]. In Nietzsche’s Werke X: Nachgelaßene Werke. Leipzig: C.G. Naumann, 1903.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense.” In Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the early 1870s. Ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the early 1870s. Ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. “Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne” [1873]. In Werke III.2. Nietzsche Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973.
Shelley, Mary. Frankenstein; Or, The Modern Prometheus: The 1818 Text. Ed. James Rieger. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed., 1982.
Shelley, Mary. The Last Man. Ed. Hugh J. Luke, Jr. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965.
Shelley, Mary. Mary Shelley’s Journal. Ed. Frederick L. Jones. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947.
1 Maurice Blanchot, L’écriture du désastre (Paris: Gallimard, 1980), 29–30.
2 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 14, translation modified.
3 Mary Shelley, The Last Man, ed. Hugh J. Luke, Jr. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 1.
4 Mary Shelley, Mary Shelley’s Journal, ed. Frederick L. Jones (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947), 113.
5 Shelley, The Last Man, 1.
6 For Jacques Derrida’s development of this pun in the context of a philosophical tradition of questions of apocalypse, see “No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives)”, trans. Catherine Porter and Philip Lewis, Diacritics 14 no.2 (Summer 1984): 20–31.
7 “That won’t do.”
8 Shelley, The Last Man, 1.
9 Shelley, The Last Man, 2.
10 Shelley, The Last Man, 2–3. The other “sacred remains” belonging to Mary Shelley might be recalled here: the heart of Percy, saved by Edward John Trelawny, and his literary remains.
11 John of Patmos, Apocalypse (The Book of Revelation).
12 Shelley, The Last Man, 3–4.
13 Transvestism’s confusion and conflation of roles and genderings is further complicated here by the relation between the Sibyl and her inspiration: is her enthusiasm directed at being complicit with a god or a goddess?
14 Shelley, The Last Man, 338–9.
15 Shelley, The Last Man, 339.
16 Friedrich Nietzsche, Das Philosophenbuch [1872–73/75], in Nietzsche’s Werke X: Nachgelaßene Werke (Leipzig: C. G. Naumann, 1903), §87.
17 Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870s, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979), §87.
18 See Friedrich Nietzsche, “Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne” [1873] in Werke III.2. Nietzsche Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973); “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”, in Philosophy and Truth, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale, 79–97.
19 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein; Or, The Modern Prometheus: The 1818 Text, ed. James Rieger (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed., 1982), 226; emphasis added.
20 Shelley, Frankenstein, 227–228; emphases added.
21 Shelley, Frankenstein, 228.