In light of the collusion in international armed conflict – such as involvement in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) – the question of nonviolent alternatives remains. What international policy tool can underpin the nonviolent vision implicit in claims such as “Iraq, never again”? In deliberating our basic motives towards a common goal of global human security, it is my belief that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) provides a great opportunity to both the military community and civil society. However, fundamental dilemmas need to be examined – such as the tensions between state sovereignty and human security; and, the paradox of ‘peace’-keeping that requires the threat/use of military force. How are these tensions negotiated in order to realise the R2P opportunity? As the following anecdotes from my field placements in war zones suggest, the answer to this question lies in linking R2P and the notion of ‘peace with justice’.

Introduction to R2P

The concept of R2P was born out of a Canadian initiative in 2001, deliberated at the United Nations World Summit of September 2005 and reaffirmed by UN Security Council Resolution 1674 in April 2006. I recently visited Ottawa to meet Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire, the former Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission 114for Rwanda (UNAMIR). It was General Dallaire who introduced the concept of R2P to me. The discussions we had during my visit were filmed by the Japanese national broadcasting corporation NHK, who later broadcast a one-hour documentary and published a book of our discussions.1

R2P and General Dallaire are frequently spoken of with reference to Rwanda. In 1994, the genocide which took place in Rwanda killed over 800,000 people in just 100 days. General Dallaire was, at the time, Force Commander of the UN mission in Rwanda and he had detected signs of majority Hutus making deadly, all-out attacks on minority Tutsis. As an early preventative measure, he proposed to the UN Headquarters (UN HQ) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) an intervention using military means, at least to seize caches of weapons that were being accumulated. His request was denied by headquarters. Subsequently, General Dallaire persistently proposed increasing the strength of his peacekeeping forces, including Rules of Engagement (ROE). These requests were consistently denied even after the genocide erupted and the international community became aware of the dire situation.

The UN HQ (with Kofi Annan heading up the DPKO) was afraid of losing its neutrality by using UN force against Hutus, even when faced with genocide. This UN attitude of non-interference was a result of what had happened the previous year in Somalia, where US soldiers who were part of the UN Peacekeeping Operation were killed and dragged through the streets by Somali militia. Footage of this scene was widely broadcast in the media and greatly affected US public sentiment regarding international peacekeeping missions. The Clinton administration, therefore, did not pressure the UN Security Council to intervene. As a result, General Dallaire was obliged to stand by and witness the terror of the Rawandan genocide. Today, as an elected senator in Canada, he is a strong advocate of R2P.

R2P essentially means that if a state ignores a gross violation of human rights, or becomes a part of it, the international community has the responsibility to intervene, even if this entails the use of military

115force. However, a tension between these two principles exists. That is, the principle of non-interference regarding state sovereignty, and the responsibility of the international community to respond to massive human rights violations, such as genocide and crimes against humanity. In my discussions with General Dallaire, this tension took on another dimension: the possibility that R2P could be used by sovereign states as an excuse for military aggression, as seen in the case of the 2003 occupation of Iraq sanctioned by the Bush administration. So, how do we implement R2P? How do we negotiate the principle of ‘non-intervention’ for legitimate cases and differentiate between a case that genuinely calls for R2P and a case that is being politically manoeuvred? The cue lies in linking peace with justice.

The case of Sierra Leone

Shortly after the September 11 attacks, a BBC World Service program focused on Africa. I listened to this broadcast while I was serving on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) as Chief of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). On this occasion a Sierra Leonean woman called from the nation’s capital, Freetown. She said, “I would like to suggest to Mr George W. Bush the ultimate solution to end the war against the terror.” The interviewer asked, “What is this?” and she replied, “this is to appoint Osama bin Laden as Vice-President of the United States.” Another interviewer asked, “why do you think that is the ultimate solution?” She replied, “this is exactly what happened in Sierra Leone in order to stop the twelve-year war – appointing Foday Sankoh as the Vice-President of Sierra Leone. He was the person who had ordered the massacre of thousands of children.” This appointment was brokered by the United States, and because of this, the final disarmament program for which I was responsible was about to start in Sierra Leone.

Foday Sankoh, the infamous head of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), was the mastermind of the brutal twelve-year war in Sierra Leone. Another important figure was Charles Taylor, former president of Liberia who was the patron of RUF, an anti-government rebel group. Both Sankoh and Taylor made Sierra Leone infamous for ‘blood diamonds’. Child solders were another sobering feature of the Sierra Leone war. 116An estimated 300,000–500,000 people were killed and significant numbers cruelly tortured. So, how was this war ended? The final phase of the disarmament program started on 18 May 2001; disarmament and demobilisation were completed on 18 January 2002. We succeeded in disarming almost 50,000 combatants. President Kabbah then declared ‘War Don Don’. This is a Creole expression meaning, ‘War is over’. After four months of ‘War Don Don’, the first postwar general election was held and Kabbah was re-elected. However, there was also a much deeper story. In July of 1999, the controversial Lome Peace Accord was brokered. This was the key accord which led to the final disarmament program. In its article on ‘Pardon and amnesty’, the accord, “in order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone”, granted Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon, which was also extended to all combatants and collaborators. This extensive amnesty was an agreement not to pursue justice – even for war criminals.

As an annex of this accord, Foday Sankoh was given the post of Vice-President and also control of the Ministry of Natural Resources to control the ‘blood diamonds’. Who brokered this accord? The US Clinton Administration appointed Reverend Jesse Jackson as Special Ambassador for Peace in Africa. Historically, the US has had a particular moral obligation to Liberia and its neighbour Sierra Leone since the emancipation of slaves. They tried to seek a solution that would not cost their own nation a single penny; that is, one that would not pursue justice in relation to war crimes. In doing so, they systematically ignored the pain of the victims and the global sense of justice. Due to this, anti-US sentiment rapidly grew among the people in Sierra Leone and this deal has now become something the US would rather forget.

At the time of the Lome Accord, the United Nations was silent. However, the UN took full advantage of the United States’ action, securing the credit for ending the twelve-year war in Sierra Leone through its mission: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. I have to admit, via the DDR program, we might have sent a terrible message to the next generation of Sierra Leoneans: that killing a few people is regarded as homicide, but in cases like this, the killing of thousands could be pardoned and even rewarded. A question we must ask ourselves is, how can R2P be a link to peace with justice? 117

The case of Japan

The concept of R2P and its links to peace with justice seem to be well understood by the Japanese public. This is because R2P is a built-in concept in the preamble of the Japanese Constitution, which has been unchanged since the end of World War II. It states:

However, there is a need to be vigilant in reaffirming the language and practice of peace with justice. As discussed above, politicians can use R2P as an excuse for military aggression. Indeed, the current and previous Japanese regimes have been riding this trend by sending our Self-Defense Force (SDF) abroad under claims about national interests. Even when the ‘justice’ of the war in Iraq is being seriously challenged – as demonstrated by the Republican election defeat in the US – Japanese statesmen are promoting support for an armed SDF to join US military engagements as a matter of strategic national interest. As a patriot, I feel ashamed that the Japanese public seems to support this argument. It is indeed a huge tragedy that R2P, a significant (although controversial) concept, will lose its noble foundation in Japan, for the sake of domestic 118politics; including significant governmental moves to abolish Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution – the clause renouncing war and the threat or use of force as means of settling disputes and the maintenance of a Japanese army.

The case of Afghanistan

Whilst I was stationed as Special Representative of the Japanese Government for DDR in Afghanistan, I learned more about unmasking peace with justice. I learned that after September 11 the most effective way for US air raids to defeat the Taliban was to use them to support the Northern Alliance who were fighting on the ground. After the fall of the Taliban, it was the Northern Alliance warlords who became the major obstacle to the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Therefore, the international community was led to believe sustainable peace for Afghanistan was now dependent on defeating these warlords and depleting their military supplies. Here, the importance of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and creating a trustworthy national army, police and judiciary became of paramount importance, and building a single New Afghan Army was most crucial. Japan was responsible for the DDR section. Indeed, the Afghan New Army has been given legitimacy and weapons through the DDR and I was responsible for implementing this strategy.

So, how is the present situation in Afghanistan after DDR? It is getting worse. When I drew up the blueprint to dismantle the Northern Alliance, I clearly warned that disarmament would create a power vacuum. If this power vacuum of the Northern Alliance was not filled swiftly by other sectors of SSR, the Taliban might regain power. This power vacuum has not yet been filled; and the coordination among other sectors of SSR seems corrupted. The Police Force, which is the responsibility of Germany, is also problematic. Moreover, the narcotics business is flourishing in Afghanistan feeding corruption at all levels of governance. So, I have to say DDR was a great success as a stand-alone project, but it completely failed in the context of SSR. In other words, DDR was a success politically, but a failure militarily. We have to realise that the Security Sector Reforms of Afghanistan – our strategic response in the so-called war on terror – is collapsing at its very foundations. 119

In 2009, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is ongoing. The Japanese Self Defense Force has been supporting OEF in the Indian Ocean since 2001 despite ongoing debates about whether to continue this activity. Is there any way out? No, unless the international community closely looks at alternatives to military solutions. There can be no resolution unless we seriously look at governance in Afghanistan, the strongest narcotic nation in the world in spite of all efforts made by the international community. Those former warlords, whom I met through the disarmament program, are still holding immense power as ‘mafia’ bosses, as well as parliamentarians. The ‘collateral’ damage caused by OEF has created deep distrust amongst the civilian population towards the international community and the new government.

There can be no resolution unless we link peace with justice. In March 2007, the Amnesty Law was passed in both houses of the Afghan parliament, granting an absolute pardon to any kind of war crimes to anybody, including the top leaders. This was because those former warlords wanted to give themselves further indulgences, preventing their war crimes from being investigated in the future. This resembles the situation in Sierra Leone, where human rights organisations and advocates warned against legitimising ‘impunity’ as a so-called peaceful solution for conflict.

Approaching peace with justice

There are tensions embedded within the R2P agenda: tensions between prevention and reaction; response and attack; national and international responsibility; and, military intervention as peacekeeping. However, if these tensions can be negotiated in the spirit of working towards a common goal of global security that respects human rights and promotes peace with justice, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) provides a great opportunity for international citizenship. Of crucial importance is recognition that the absence of violence is not enough to define ‘peace’. As seen above in the cases of Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, the international community’s intervention to cease direct violence did not include the notion of ‘peace with justice’, of bringing war criminals to trial rather than rewarding them with government posts. The ensuing negative peace is fragile, unlikely to be sustained. In the case of Iraq, hollow 120claims about invading the country to instil ‘democracy’ are equally lacking in an understanding of ‘peace with justice’. Unjust military interventions never create ‘just peace’. There is a need to be vigilant in reaffirming the language and practice of peace with justice. The global civil society campaign to protect Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, as detailed in chapter 11, is such an example. Reclaiming R2P as an instrument that promotes peace with justice as a key to global human security is also necessary to any vision of disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation towards a nonviolent world.