CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX
Many nations are embracing the concept of open and unrestricted access to public sector information – particularly scientific, environmental, and statistical information of great public benefit. Federal information policy in the US is based on the premise that government information is a valuable national resource and that the economic benefits to society are maximised when taxpayer funded information is made available inexpensively and as widely as possible. This policy is expressed in the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and in Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-130, ‘Management of Federal Information Resources’.2 This policy actively encourages the development of a robust private sector, offering to provide publishers with the raw content from which new information services may be created, at no more than the cost of dissemination and without copyright or other restrictions.
In other countries, particularly in Europe, publicly funded government agencies treat their information holdings as a commodity used to generate short-term revenue. They assert monopoly control on certain categories of information to recover the costs of its collection or creation. Such arrangements tend to preclude other entities from developing markets for the information or otherwise disseminating the information in the public interest.
In the US, open and unrestricted access to public sector information has resulted in the rapid growth of information intensive industries particularly in the geographic information and environmental services sectors. Similar growth has not occurred in Europe due to restrictive government information practices. As a convenient shorthand, one might label the American and European approaches as ‘open access’ and ‘cost recovery’, respectively. The cost recovery model is now being challenged on a variety of grounds: 593
This report examines fundamental differences in the policy and funding models for public sector information (PSI) in the US as compared to Europe. The following figure illustrates these differences.
594This report seeks to demonstrate the economic and societal benefits of open access and dissemination policies for public sector information, particularly as compared to the limitations of the ‘cost recovery’ or ‘government commercialisation’ approach.
It focuses primarily on the conclusions of recent economic and public policy research in this area, as well as examples of failed or limited cost recovery experiments in the US and Europe. Emerging European thinking on the issue of government competition with the private sector, and recent developments at the European Commission level and in selected European countries are briefly summarised.3
The vast economic potential of public sector information has only recently begun to be recognised in the economics and public policy literature. Recent significant research, much of it originating in Europe, documents the effect that governmental information policies have on the economy in general and on particular sectors.
With respect to the growing challenge from economists, the European Commission’s Directorate General for the Information Society commissioned a study from PIRA International on the Commercial Exploitation of Europe’s Public Sector Information. (‘the PIRA study’)4. The PIRA study attempts to quantify the economic potential of public sector information in Europe and the extent to which it is being commercially exploited, and suggests policy initiatives and good practices. Although some of the qualitative data had to be extrapolated, the study should be sufficient to persuade policymakers of the need for serious rethinking of European information policy and its high priority. PIRA states:
Cost recovery looks like an obvious way for governments to minimize the costs related to public sector information and contribute to maximizing value for money directly. In fact, it is not clear at all that this is the best approach to maximizing the economic value of public sector information to society as a whole. Moreover, it is not even clear that it is the best approach from the viewpoint of government finances. […] Estimates of the US public sector information market place suggest that it is up to five times the size of the EU market.
The PIRA study went on to observe that the fledgling European market would not even have to double in size for governments to more than recoup in extra tax receipts what they would lose by ceasing to charge for public sector information. The problem is that these positive macro-economic effects are masked by the adaptation of European markets to cost recovery policies, by which both individual agencies and partner publishers have grown adept at extracting monopoly rents from captive markets to their own benefit but to the detriment of the economy at large. Furthermore, as the study noted with understatement: 595
The concept of commercial companies being able to acquire, at very low cost, quantities of public sector information and resell it for a variety of unregulated purposes to make a profit is one that policymakers in the EU find uncomfortable.
The amounts of money involved are significant. PIRA distinguished between government investment in public sector information (‘Investment Value’) and the value added by users in the economy as a whole (‘Economic Value’). Economic Value could not be directly obtained, so aggregated data was used. PIRA estimated the Investment Value of public sector information for the entire European Union at 9.5 billion EURO/year. The Economic Value was estimated at 68 billion EURO a year. By comparison, the Investment Value for the United States is 19 billion EURO/year and the Economic Value is 750 billion EURO/year. To summarise:
Economic Potential of PSI in Europe and US | ||
In EUROs | EU | US |
Investment value | 9.5 billion | 19 billion |
Economic value | 68 billion | 750 billion |
This contrast points to both opportunities and challenges for European companies and their governments. PIRA’s main conclusions are:
A study commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior examined both qualitative and quantitative prosperity effects of different pricing models for public sector information5: no cost, marginal cost and full cost recovery. Its main conclusions:
A U.S. National Academy of Sciences study6 which examined the practices of commercialised government agencies in Europe and experiences with privatisation of environmental data in the US concluded:
‘…[c]ountries that exercise intellectual property rights over government data…limit the extent to which government-collected data can be used, even in international collaborations. By making it more difficult to integrate global data sets and share knowledge, such a commercialization policy will fail to achieve the maximum benefits provided by international collaboration in the scientific endeavor’.
For example, basic research on monsoon prediction at the India Institute of Technology is hampered by the unaffordable prices for historic atmospheric model data from the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting. As a result, the researchers are not able to integrate the European data with freely available US data.7
Thus, the Academy recommended:
A study8 commissioned by the private sector members of the Dutch Federal Geographic Data Committee attempts to quantify the economic effects of open access policies for spatial data. The main conclusions are:
A North American-European comparative study on the impact of government information policies, which focused on databases from national mapping agencies,9 concluded that:
A study prepared for the Canadian government examined the European Database Directive, which does not exclude governments from using the database protection right and gives European governments an extra argument for cost recovery policies.10 Therefore, its findings are important in the debate on public sector information policies:
– Excessive protection for certain databases (e.g. phone directories, environmental observations);
– New barriers to data aggregation;
– New opportunities for dominant firms to harass competitors with threats of litigation;
– Increased transactional gridlock due to so-called ‘anti-commons’ effects; and
– Inadvertent impediments and disincentives for non-commercial database providers, e.g. universities and other research institutes.
John Zillman, Director of the Australian Meteorological Department and John Freebairn of the University of Melbourne recently performed extensive theoretical research on the economics of meteorological information.11
Their main conclusions are:
The Weather Risk Management Association, representing an emerging economic sector which uses weather and climate data to mitigate commercial risk, commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers to study the rapid growth of this industry.12 The study shows that the weather risk management industry is booming in the United States (9,696 million USD in contract value in 5 years ending March 2002) compared to the small European market (721.3 million USD in the same 5 years)
Notional Value by Contract Coverage Period and Region, All Contract Types (in thousands of US Dollars) | ||||||
Coverage Period | North America | Europe | Asia | Australia | Other | Total |
1997 | 169,410 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 169,410 |
1998 | 1,835,238 | 320 | 0 | 0 | 300 | 1,835,858 |
1999 | 2,882,423 | 70,690 | 4,360 | 0 | 1,689 | 2,959,162 |
2000 | 2,409,185 | 49,329 | 45,067 | 2,523 | 10,541 | 2,516,645 |
2001 | 2,400,000 | 90,000 | 90,000 | 25,000 | 1,190,001 | 4,306,000 |
Total | 9,696,256 | 721,339 | 139,427 | 27,523 | 1,202,530 | 11,787,075 |
599A comparison of US and European commercial meteorology activity also illustrates a significant disparity. The prosperous commercial meteorology activity in the US has resulted in a tenfold difference in the number of firms, revenue, and job creation.13
Given that the US and EU economies are approximately the same size, the primary reason for the European weather risk management and commercial meteorology markets to lag so far behind the US is the restrictive data policies of a number of European national meteorological services.
The larger public policy issue behind public sector information policies is whether or not commercial government activities that compete with the private sector are proper for a government agency funded primarily by the taxpayers. In 1995, European national meteorological services prevailed in the World Meteorological Organization on the issue of replacing the organisation’s previous policy of full and open exchange of meteorological information with a procedure (WMO Resolution 40, CgXII), which sanctions charging and use restrictions on broad categories of data. In the words of the National Academy’s ‘Privatization’ study, summarised above:
The change of policy was aimed at preventing private sector entities from competing with national meteorological services in Europe, which recoup costs through sales of data and services… WMO Resolution 40 substantially decreased the amount of data member nations made freely available.14
Three recent examples illustrate the Academy’s point.
– Anyone engaging in the sale of meteorological [data] as well as providing sovereign activities, is acting as an independent party in the commercial process and, as a public undertaking, is subject to the provisions of the Antitrust Act … In the Swiss market, [the Swiss Meteorological Institute] has a market-dominating position. It must make available to interested third parties on a non-discriminatory manner all the data and products which it uses for its own services15
– This is for sure no fair competition … The commercial companies are pushed to the wall
The Finnish Competition Authority found that the FMI abused its dominant position in the national meteorological data market and recommended an infringement fine of FIM 200,000 (33,500 Euro) on the FMI for its breach of competition legislation. To remedy this situation, the Finnish government has announced plans to separate and privatise the commercial arm of FMI as a self-sustaining private sector entity without government subsidy, and retain its ‘public purpose’ functions in a taxpayer funded government agency subject to open data policies.17
In addition to Finland, two other European countries are actively reconsidering the wisdom of such policies and practices.
In Sweden, the Agency for Administrative Development’s (Statskontoret) seminal report ‘The State as Commercial Actor’ identified a range of issues associated with government entities entering the commercial field and the effects on the private sector18. For example, they found that the National Land Survey:
In light of these findings the Statskontoret recommended that the commercial arm of the National Land Survey be completely privatised, subject to open public audit and oversight, and its data holdings placed in the public domain for access by the general public and competing private sector entities.
As follow-on to ‘The State as Commercial Actor’, the Statskontoret was asked to examine the operations of the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (SMHI), and has reached
601similar conclusions.19 It recommended that the commercial functions of SMHI be split off into a private corporation, and the essential government functions of SMHI be retained in a government agency with an open and unrestricted data policy. The study went one step further by recommending that the practice of ‘cross-subsidisation’ of SMHI by ‘assignment’ work from other government agencies should cease. Validated requirements of agencies responsible for roads, fisheries, forestry, etc. would either be put out to bid, or would be designated as inherently governmental and specifically authorised to be performed by SMHI under direct appropriations. The Statskontoret recognised, as argued elsewhere in this paper, that transfer payments from other government agencies have usually been counted by national meteorological services as part of their ‘commercial’ revenues, and touted as part of their success at ‘commercialisation’. An effective date for the separation of SMHI into private and governmental arms has yet to be established.
In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Economic Affairs published a report on unfair government competition with the private sector in the specific context of public sector information.20 The main conclusions were:
Based on this report, the Dutch government separated the commercial arm from the Dutch Royal Meteorological Institute into a commercial entity.
The Swedish and Dutch studies agree generally with consensus views in the US, which are restated by Stiglitz, et al., ‘Role of Government in a Digital Age’21. The Computer and Communications Industry Association commissioned Nobel Laureate and former chair of the US Council of Economic Advisors, Joseph Stiglitz, to analyse the role of government in a digital age, with particular emphasis on public-private competition issues through a number of agency case studies. With regard to the National Weather Service partnership with the private sector and the balance between public and private roles, the report concluded: ‘The National Weather Service seems to strike this balance well’.
An opposite viewpoint remains prevalent among commercialised European government agencies, particularly among national mapping and meteorological agencies. It has been articulated formally in the United Kingdom, where Ministries actively encourage government bodies to develop value-added services charged at market prices: 602
All government bodies will be free to offer value added products and services providing this is done in a transparent manner in a level playing field among all market participants.22
We agree, however, with the central conclusions of both the Swedish and Dutch governments that a level playing field without unfair competition and cross subsidisation is impossible in the case of government agencies providing both commercial and public interest services. Two recent significant experiments in the UK will test this conclusion.
In December 2001, the UK government preliminarily decided to transfer the entire Ordnance Survey from a ‘Trading Fund’ to a government-owned public limited company (PLC) with the government owning 100% of the shares. By contrast, in Sweden (land office and met office, SMHI), the Netherlands (met office, KNMI) and soon Finland (met office, FMI), the approach is privatisation of the ‘commercial arm’ while retaining the ‘public interest’ arm in the government. The belief in Sweden, Holland and Finland is that the basic observing systems and the official forecasts and warnings generated from their data are inherently governmental, as are the public interest mapping and land registration functions of the Swedish land office. This approach inevitably leads to an open data policy since the new ‘spin off’ will need to fend for itself against competition, and the only way to guarantee a ‘level playing field’ is through an open data policy.
In the Ordnance Survey situation, as pointed out by the Swedish Statskontoret in the context of the analogous Swedish agency, if the entity performs both governmental and commercial functions it will tend to have a natural monopoly position due to economies of scale and other factors, and will continue to need infusions of taxpayer funds (even if under contract rather than as a direct appropriation) as ‘commercial’ revenues will not be adequate to fund the ‘public interest’ aspect. If this is accompanied by the right to control the underlying data, funded in part by the taxpayers, healthy competition from other private entities and the overall growth of that economic sector will be impeded.
Using a different model, the UK Met Office has recently entered into a joint venture with private sector interests to create a new entity, Weather Exchange Ltd., which will carry out the functions of the Met Office’s commercial arm, and seek to develop and market a range of value added products. The private interests will contribute capital and staff, and the Met Office will contribute data and staff. Outstanding questions are whether this new entity will have any of the competitive advantages cited by the Swedish Statskontoret in the context of publicly owned commercial entities, and whether the Met Office will adopt a completely open data policy. How these questions are answered will determine whether the commercial meteorology and weather risk management industries in the UK begin to expand, and at what rate.
There have been a number of examples of failed cost recovery experiments in the United States at both the Federal and State levels, which demonstrate concretely the practical effects of restrictive data policies. 603
– Some of the responses from people requesting data is, ‘I can’t afford that! That blows the entire budget for this project’. So they choose not to buy ANY of the data, hang up the phone, and generally go away with a bad taste about the entire program. I don’t think we’re generating much support this way. When people choose not to use our data because it is too expensive, what are the implications? Most people who want to use the data are doing something to the land which affects the community that we all live in. Without good, accurate data, are these people able to make the best decisions? I’ve seen it from both sides of the fence, and I plan to work on revising our policy.
We believe the perceived benefits of cost recovery have generally been overstated by commercialised European government agencies. The following five examples support this point:
– Stepwise designation of all meteorological data as ‘essential’ under WMO Resolution 40;
– Adoption of an ‘open and unrestricted’ data dissemination policy with charges limited to distribution costs only.
– The private user base that can be charged is not large enough to support recovery of the full costs of a comprehensive, unsubsidised information service;
– Charging other government users merely shifts the expenses from one agency to another rather than actually saving the national treasury any money;
– Due to some of the fundamental economic characteristics of information (high elasticity of demand, public good characteristics) one must question whether any governmental entity can successfully raise revenue adequate to pay not only for the dissemination of its information but also for the costs associated with creating the information for governmental purposes in the first instance
– High prices for information ultimately lead to predatory and anticompetitive practices, like price dumping, and the creation of government owned corporations or joint ventures with preferred private sector entities that may serve to exclude others from the market.
In sum, recognition is slowly emerging in Europe that open access to government information is critical to the information society, the scientific endeavour, and economic growth. However, recent trends towards more ‘liberal’ policies face opposition. This comes from treasuries as well as from entrepreneurial civil servants in charge of ‘government commercialisation’ initiatives, who are sometimes tempted to engage in anti-competitive practices. Therefore, these issues require consideration at the highest policy making levels of government.
Recognising the scale of the opportunity presented, and the speed of enabling technological change, the US and the EU should commit to move forward together to take the practical steps necessary to establish internationally harmonised open and unrestricted data policies for all public sector information.
* This was first published as a report titled Borders in Cyberspace: Conflicting Public Sector Information Policies and their Economic Impacts by Peter Weiss. The original report is available at: www.epsiplatform.eu/psi_library/reports/borders_in_cyberspace
1 U. S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. National Weather Service. Contract support from Yvette Pluijmers, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, is gratefully acknowledged.
2 Respectively, 44 United States Code Chapter 35, and 61 Federal Register 6428 (February 20, 1996).
3 This summary report is accompanied by a longer monograph that includes as Appendices a primer on the economics of information, a point-by-point refutation of arguments commonly made in support of cost recovery, and suggestions for further research. They are not summarised here.
4 PIRA International (2000) Commercial Exploitation of Europe’s Public Sector Information. Final Report for the European Commission, Directorate General for the Information Society.
5 Berenschot and Nederlands Economisch Instituut (2001) Welvaartseffecten van verschillende financieringsmethoden van elektronische gegevensbestanden. Report for the Minister for Urban Policy and Integration of Ethnic Minorities.
6 Resolving conflicts arising from the privatization of environmental data, Committee on Geophysical and Environmental Data. Board on Earth Sciences and Resources. Division on Earth and Life Studies. National Research Council. Washington, DC. National Academy Press, 2001.
7 Goswami, et al. Association between quasi-biweekly oscillations and summer monsoon variabilities, Indian Meteorological Society (March 2001).
8 Ravi Bedrijvenplatform (2000) Economische effecten van laagdrempelige beschikbaarstelling van overheidsinformatie. Publication 00–02.
9 Lopez, Xavier R. (1998) The dissemination of spatial data: a North American-European comparative study on the impact of government information policy. Ablex Publishing Corporation. See also: Lopez, Xavier R. (1996) The impact of government information policy on the dissemination of spatial data. PhD Thesis. University of Maine, Department of Spatial Information Engineering.
10 Maurer, Stephen M. (2001) Across Two Worlds: Database Protection in the US and Europe. A paper prepared for Industry Canada’s Conference on Intellectual Property and Innovation in the Knowledge Based Economy. May 23–24, 2001. See also: Stephen M. Maurer, P. Bernt Hugenholtz, and Harlan J. Onsrud. Intellectual Property: Europe’s Database Experiment. Science 2001 October 26; 294: 789–90. (In: Policy Forum). 598
11 Zillman, J.W. and J.W. Freebairn (2000). Economic Framework for the Provision of Meteorological Services. Also see the background papers: Freebairn, John W. and John W. Zillman (2000). ‘Economic Benefits of Meteorological Services’. Meteorological Applications (2002). And Freebairn, John W. and John W. Zillman (2000). ‘Funding meteorological services’. Meteorological Applications (2002).
12 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002) The weather risk management industry: survey findings for November 1997 to March 31, 2002. Prepared for the Weather Risk Management Association, June 2002. Website: wrma.cyberspace.com/library/public/file345.doc.
13 Sources: Commercial Weather Services Association, Association of Environmental Data Users of Europe.
14 National Research Council (2001). Resolving conflicts arising from the privatization of environmental data. National Academy Press.
15 Swiss Competition Commission (November 16, 1998). The case is being appealed on other grounds.
16 Der Spiegel, Issue 47 at p. 230, (November 19, 2001).
17 Interview with Finnish Competition Authority, September 2001.
18 ‘The State as Commercial Actor’ (2000). Available only in Swedish.
19 ‘Prognos för SMHI - myndighet, bolag eller både och?’ (‘Forecast for the SMHI - authority, company or both?’) 11 January 2002. Available only in Swedish.
20 Ministry of Economic Affairs (1997). Markt en Overheid; spelregels voor gelijke concurrentieverhoudingen tussen overheidsorganisaties en private ondernemingen.
21 Stiglitz, et al. (2000). Role of Government in a Digital Age. Computer and Communications Industry Association. October 2000.
22 Department of Trade and Industry (2000) Click-Use-Pay – Hewitt. News Release September 6, 2000, P/2000/602.
23 United States General Accounting Office, Accounting and Management Division, March 10 1995 GAO/AIMD-95-93R ATFI User Fees. Also see: Washington Post Editorial, August 4 1992, ‘Boats, Budgets and a Bad Idea’.
24 Blakemore, Michael and Gurmukh Singh (1992) Cost Recovery Charging for Government Information. A false economy? pp. 30–34; updated by USGS staff.
25 National States Geographic Information Council (2001) Fees for Data discussion. Informal email discussion.
26 Email from Jeff DuMez, Coordinator, Brown County Land Information Office (Dec. 2001).
27 See ‘It’s raining weathermen’, The Financial Times (April 23.2001).
28 Bundesrechnungshof (2000) Gebühreneinnahmen aus Flugwetterdienstleistungen des Deutschen Wetterdienstes and Entwicklung der Ausgaben und Einnahmen des Deutschen Wetterdienstes.
29 Statement of Charles DuPuy before the Swedish Meteorology Society, October 2000.
30 WMO Regional Office for the Americas, Regional Seminar on Marketing for NMHSs (September 2001).
31 Directive on market activities conducted by government departments, Dutch Official Journal 1998, no. 95.
32 See e.g. Lopez, Xavier points out the importance of National Mapping data for commercial purposes.
33 The Economist August 25th 2001. ‘Battling over bricks. A growing row over intellectual property rights’. p. 54.