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In this chapter we discuss the relevance of Johan Galtung’s peace journalism theory in dealing with the media coverage of historically oriented security policy issues such as Nordic defence cooperation. Previous research shows that national contexts have substantial framing impacts on mediated war discourses. After 9/11 and the global war on terror (GWOT), international politics have changed dramatically with new foreign and security policy alliances emerging. In the Scandinavian region, the previous division between NATO members (Denmark and Norway) and non-aligned countries (Finland and Sweden) is gradually reducing in importance and new patterns of cooperation are taking over. The Nordic countries are presently involved in formal defence cooperation through NORDCAPS (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support), NORDAC (Nordic Armaments Co-operation), and NORDSUP (Nordic Supportive Defence Structures). In November 2010, the Nordic defence ministers proposed a stronger alliance between the Nordic countries with a commitment for each to react if one of the others were subjected to threat or attack. At the same time the future presence of the Norwegian, Danish and Swedish forces in Afghanistan is under debate as most NATO members seem to be eager to set a date for withdrawing their International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) contingents by 2014. Interestingly, the issue of Afghanistan is absent from the public discourse on Nordic defence cooperation.218

In this chapter we try to find out what this new situation means for security policy discourses in the media. By analysing the proposal for closer military cooperation between NATO-member Norway and non-aligned Sweden, jointly proposed by the two countries’ commanders-in-chief in August 2007, we will critically discuss how useful Johan Galtung’s peace journalism model is for analysis of such a debate. As a complementary approach, we propose critical discourse analysis (CDA) because of its more sophisticated method for contextualising.

Earlier research

Our earlier studies of media coverage of the Gulf war (1990–91), the Kosovo war (1999), the Afghanistan war (2001) and the Iraq war (2003) have revealed the different framing of these conflicts in our respective countries’ media (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001; Nohrstedt et al. 2002; Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005). However, considering the close collaboration between Norway’s and Sweden’s troops in Afghanistan, and also with US and other NATO members’ military forces during the GWOT, it seems important to analyse how these changes are discursively constructed for public information and deliberation. A particularly interesting and relevant case here is the ongoing political elitist debate within the Nordic Defence Forces about seeking a new role in the post-Cold War area. The main question addressed in this article is whether and how these strategic security-policy matters are constructed and manufactured for public opinion consumption.

Methodological approach

The earlier research mentioned above concerning the Gulf War, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq was all based on extensive empirical data with comparative studies of the media coverage in several countries including, of course, Sweden and Norway. Several methods were used including quantitative content analyses based on issues like genres, use of sources, and framing. Overall, these studies have used a combination of quantitative and qualitative data, the latter often dealt with using critical discourse analysis (CDA). The character of the study presented here differs from those mentioned above since the topic, Nordic defence 219cooperation, has not been a particularly ‘hot’ one in the news. This is actually our first finding – that is, that there is a lack of news journalism coverage of this important issue in mainstream media. Instead of concentrating our analysis on news reporting as we have in previous studies, our approach here is concerned with the ways in which editorials, debate and feature articles in mainstream media relate discursively to the original spin created by the two commanders-in-chief through which they brought the military collaboration plans to public attention. Furthermore, unlike our earlier studies involving cross-national comparisons, the aim in this article is a comparative analysis of different types of media in order to yield maximum variation in our data, irrespective of whether it comes from Norwegian or Swedish media.

Since the first quantitative result, the limited amount of substantial news material concerned with our proposed topic, is valid in both countries, the idea here is to look in more detail at what comments, if any, followed from the initial article on the debate in a situation where the space (that is, news coverage) for ‘legitimate controversy’ (Hallin 1986; see also about ‘doxa’ below) has been restricted to a minimum. The major purpose here is not so much to highlight the empirical results of our study on representations of the conditions of the public sphere in each two countries, but, rather, to lead an explorative inquiry into the value of the peace journalism model for media studies of conflict communication and opinion building.

Given these considerations, we selected both a mainstream Swedish newspaper as well as the online Norwegian newspaper Nettavisen for our analysis. The reason for choosing these particular news sources was that these were the ones that incorporated discussions of public opinion related to the chosen topic. The empirical findings from the content analyses of these cases are documented elsewhere and will not be presented in detail here (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2010).

A Nordic model?

Nordic countries are often held up as a role models for other countries, since the public image of Nordic countries is often linked to the positioning of humanitarian interests as paramount (Leira et al. 2007). 220Issues such as the quest for equality, international solidarity, and the willingness to share some of their wealth with poor countries as development aid are all included in this public image. Norway has even tried to brand itself as a ‘humanitarian great power’ in its official foreign policy (Leira et al. 2007). Analysts, like the Norwegian scholar Terje Tvedt, have criticised this rhetoric and representation, claiming that Scandinavian countries should be judged by their actual policy rather than their projected image (Tvedt 2003). We support this criticism and question whether Norwegian and Swedish participation in the ‘war on terror’ as allies of the US has contributed negatively, rather than positively, to global affairs. To be more precise, we argue that this self-image might in itself become a risk factor for the two small countries. By ignoring the actual dangers of getting involved as an ally to the US in the GWOT, and by hiding this alliance behind humanitarian rhetoric, the two countries could easily be dragged into military adventures framed as peacebuilding and humanitarian intervention.

We also bring into our analysis Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of ‘doxa’ or the doxic space (1998). Originally, the notion of doxa was employed by Greek rhetoricians as a tool for the formation of an argument by referring to common opinions. The doxa was often manipulated by sophists to persuade the people to follow the arguments of the leaders. In Bourdieu’s use of doxa, he suggests that some issues are not introduced into public discourse because leaders simply try to avoid public discussions on certain topics. These issues are, so to speak, kept off of the agenda, leaving behind a false impression of consensus (von der Lippe 1991). We argue that doxa can be a useful concept for understanding why obviously relevant issues, such as the common risks posed to Sweden and Norway through participation in the GWOT, are left out of public debate when defence cooperation between Norway and Sweden is discussed in the media. The reasoning behind this is that opinion polls show strong opposition in both Sweden and Norway to having troops stationed in Afghanistan. Since there seems to be great unity among politicians in both Sweden and Norway that the two countries should support the US in the GWOT, they are apparently trying to avoid public debate on the issue by treating it as a topic ‘beyond discussion’.221

The peace journalism discourse

Peace journalism has been proposed as an alternative to traditional war journalism by several scholars and journalists following its original formulation by Johan Galtung (2002). It has also been criticised (see the special issue of Conflict and Communication Online in 2007). We acknowledge Galtung’s model for peace journalism as a useful tool for research and teaching (Ottosen 2010), but suggest (later on in this chapter) that for historical-related research, a peace journalism approach could be supplemented with critical discourse analysis (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2010).

Jake Lynch has been a supporter of Galtung’s peace journalism model and is an accomplished, published author in the field (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005; Lynch 2007, 2008; Galtung & Lynch 2010). In answer to the critics of peace journalism, Lynch claims that they underestimate leaders in the Western world when it comes to willingness and ability to manipulate the media. Especially in the phase of a conflict where there is a mobilisation to go to war based on rhetoric in favour of ‘humanitarian intervention’ (like in Yugoslavia in 1999 and prior to the war in Iraq in 2003), Lynch argues that propaganda must be contextualised by the media. It is vital, he argues, that the media is not seduced by propagandist rhetoric and does not adopt the vocabulary and arguments of spin-doctors in favour of war. Lynch stresses that the basic aim of peace journalists is to ‘create opportunities for society at large to consider non-violent responses’.

Quoting Entman, Lynch argues that in order to give the public a fuller picture, journalists should make visible what the propaganda machinery leaves out – that is, peace alternatives and realistic information on the consequences of war (Lynch 2007, p2). We support Lynch’s position and our own findings from several research projects fall very much in line with his arguments (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2001, 2005). We put even more emphasis on the impact of psychological operations (PSYOPS) and their impact on media reporting. In retrospect many of the misleading stories defending the intervention in Iraq had their origin in disinformation that was a result of PSYOPS and propaganda (Eide & Ottosen 2008). One important PSYOPS operation was the US 222Army pulling down the statue of Saddam Hussein and then portraying it as a spontaneous reaction from the people in Baghdad. The importance of propaganda before the war is underlined in new literature like Michael Isikoff and David Corn’s book Hubris, where the authors argue that the Bush administration misled the public in their campaign for war to a level that has been underestimated by the media. Former US vice president Dick Cheney misused CIA resources by picking information that suited his argument for war, while simultaneously putting aside information that contradicted claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

For example, in a speech in front of veterans of foreign wars on 26 August 2002, Cheney presented a highly selective and tendentious account of data supplied by the CIA, to make a claim that was, in fact, unsupported by any evidence in the possession of the US intelligence community at the time: ‘There is no doubt he is amassing WMD to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us’ (Isikoff & Corn 2006, pp28–29). Isikoff and Corn reveal a forceful will in the Bush administration to go to war over whatever it chooses. When Karl Rove once told the then president about polls suggesting opposition in the public opinion against war, the president exploded: ‘Don’t tell me about fucking polls. I don’t care what the polls say’ (Isikoff & Corn 2006, p29). The extent of systematic lies repeated again and again had the desired impact, and public opinion changed to be more sympathetic to war as the solution to the ‘Saddam Hussein problem’.

Critique of peace journalism from a CDA perspective

In the vibrant debate on peace journalism (PJ), CDA is underestimated as a supplement. CDA has emerged as one of the influential approaches within media studies in general and could play a vital role in research on war- and peace-journalism as well. We believe that the debate on journalism research can gain a lot if it draws more on this linguistically inspired analysis. There are a number of consequences if this idea is pursued in war- and peace-journalism.

If journalism is defined as a discourse, it is implied that the final journalistic products are perceived to carry and contain meanings on 223several levels. These levels cannot be collapsed into a single ‘manifest content’ level. As with other fields of communication, meaning is based on multi-level interrelations. This also means that in CDA, aspects of mediated conflict coverage that are rarely or not at all noticed in debates about journalism, such as the importance of the context, interdiscursive relations and the meaning of omissions, are addressed and integrated with the analysis. Considering that the concept of discourse is defined by its institutional dimension, the structural conditions and the organisational setting are at the centre of attention in the analysis. This is not unique to CDA but is treated in this approach as being fundamental to any reasonable conclusions. Hence when analysing media content, the layers of meanings related and alluding to other discourses beyond journalism itself are of particular importance. This interrelated set of discourses is, however, not randomly configured according to our application of CDA, but rather, is regarded as constituting a ‘discursive order’ – a term coined by Norman Fairclough (1995). We will exemplify the ways in which these theoretical points of departure are put to use in our analytical work, but first a few more comments must be made to state our position in the field of CDA research.

The label ‘critical’ is relevant as one common denominator in CDA research as it indicates the normative character of projects. It means that communication is explored with an intention to point out other possible realities than the one under investigation. This normative orientation also comes with a theoretical focus on relations of power, dominance and hegemony. These are all challenged as obstacles to the empowerment of non-elite peoples who are caught in the discursive nets spun by ideologues, public relations strategists, and politicians. As indicated above, one of the critical angles of CDA research is its insistence upon hidden assumptions and latent, but nevertheless relevant, cognitive or emotive discursive elements.

The CDA field is inhabited by three different ‘schools’: the socio-psychological Dutch variant with Teun van Dijk as the leading figure, the linguistic British school with Norman Fairclough as the most wellknown scholar, and the discourse-historical approach developed by the Austrian school with Ruth Wodak as its leader (Wodak 1996, 2001). 224After Wodak’s relocation to Lancaster, UK, the geographical dimension has become somewhat obsolete, and in addition, it should be mentioned that all these ‘schools’ are collaborating extensively and seem to mutually regard their differences as complementary assets.

In this article we rely mainly on the historically oriented variant as developed by Wodak and her colleagues (Wodak & Benke 2001). The main reason for this is their successful applications of inter-discursive analysis diachronically, and the insights they offer to understanding the operations of contextual conditions for the creation of meaning in different settings – for example, parliamentary debates, public ceremonies, media, exhibitions, and conversations overheard on the street corner. Here, due to practical limitations, we concentrate on journalism as a discourse related to defence policy in Scandinavian countries after the Second World War. Although this is a limited empirical basis for conclusions about the fruitfulness of applying CDA, we nevertheless hope to be able to make some critical, although constructive, comments to the debate about PJ. It makes sense because a war must be analysed as a historical process starting long before the first bullet is fired. To understand potential wars and conflicts in the years to come, we must examine the arguments in security policy debates today. As indicated above, we feel positive about the critique of mainstream war journalism coming from the peace journalism movement. But it seems to us that PJ could benefit from an integration of some of the theoretical ideas that CDA provides regarding understanding meaning-making as produced by discursive acts. If Norway and Sweden are to be involved in future wars, it might already be possible to find in the contemporary debate some reasons for this – not only in the arguments supporting a waroriented policy, but also in the topics that are kept out of the debate. In this, we think CDA has advantages that are not captured by the peace journalism model.

In sum, we contend that the CDA approach can offer the following:

In the examples we discuss below, two points in particular are important. First, that even a discourse about peace building and security plans may unintentionally be a step toward conflict escalation, and this possibility should not be left out of any critical analysis. Second, contextually speaking, we suggest that even a discourse qualified as ‘peace journalism’, to use Galtung’s terminology, could, in the context of, for example, the GWOT, be more akin to ‘war journalism’ by virtue of its consequences. These are the challenges for the critical media research field studying mediated conflict reporting today.

Empirical example 1: Norwegian media

In the autumn of 2007 the heads of Norwegian and Swedish defence, Sverre Diesen and Håkan Syrén, published a joint article in the Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet and the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, proposing closer cooperation between the two countries on military affairs and defence issues. Among the proposals were joint military exercises, military education, joint development of new military doctrines, and cooperation in buying military equipment such as warships and vehicles. In the background there was also the recent issue of Norway replacing its F-16 fighters with a new generation of fighters where the candidates were the Swedish plane JAS Gripen produced by SAAB, the European Eurofighter, and the US-produced Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) under construction by Lockheed Martin.

As mentioned in the methodological section of this chapter, by using case studies we now analyse how a few selected media in each country covered this initiative as a news event. We will also assess what the potential important issues were that were kept out of the news coverage. From Sweden, we use the example of the ways in which Dagens Nyheter and Aftonbladet reported about the Diesen–Syrén proposal. 226Dagens Nyheter is the leading quality paper in Sweden and Aftonbladet is the largest tabloid in Sweden. From Norway, we draw our case study from a news story in the electronic newspaper Nettavisen, owned by the commercial TV station TV2. This is the only major newspaper in Norway that is a pure electronic publication. The other major electronic papers are web-versions connected to and owned by print newspapers. Our reason for choosing this internet outlet is that the readers are able to comment on articles in electronic debate forums, published after the articles themselves. By using this in our analysis, we are able to include some of the arguments in the public discourse following the article of interest.

The article in question was published in Nettavisen on 31 August 2007 and was titled ‘Want a Norwegian–Swedish defence’. The article stated that a proposal on defence cooperation turned the traditional way of thinking about military affairs in the two countries upside down. Norway has traditionally been a NATO member while Sweden is an EU member. In the article, there was a link to the text published in Dagbladet. In this article, the question of sovereignty of the two countries was addressed immediately, but with a peculiar rhetorical twist, which did not invite discussion. This crucial issue was only touched upon and then ‘dismissed’: ‘We must put all old sovereignty reflexes upside down (på huvudet)’. The issue of whether Sweden wanted to keep its non-alignment security policy could have raised an important debate, but was relegated to a historical past. Further, the two commanders underlined that the proposed collaboration was ‘only’ about purchase of submarines, tanks, and other military machinery. Also mentioned was the coordination of ‘supply, education, training and doctrines’. The framing and tone was assuring and comforting. The new plans were presented as natural, uncontroversial and part of necessary development: ‘The possibilities are great [up until the] year 2012 and will [expand] further in the future’. In other words, the cooperation would not restrict the freedom of actions – on the contrary, it would improve the relationship between the countries: ‘A deeper Swedish–Norwegian collaboration provides opportunities to make our production of military forces more efficient. In this way we can strengthen our common influence within the 227entire European and Euro-Atlantic security cooperation’. This point is elaborated upon further:

In terms of macro-theme, the article describes how military cooperation makes it possible to finance necessary production and purchase of defence equipment. The selection of words and expressions implies cooperation is economically necessary and politically desirable. It is furthermore presented as entirely natural and uncontroversial: it is ‘of course nothing new’; ‘both sides … will certainly keep their full national right to make decisions about the uses of the forces’; it has ‘strong political support in both our countries’. However, a certain urgency of tone indicates that a choice of direction has to be decided: ‘We now wish to get a clear and broad political mandate to proceed from idea to action. The time is short. In both our countries the defence forces face challenges the next coming years that make decisions about the direction urgent’.

In an interview with Sverre Diesen, attached to the article, he states that he foresees no significant practical problems with the proposal and regards it as a challenge to the politicians in the two countries. He further states that he has sent a written proposal to the Norwegian defence minister (at the time) Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, claiming that it is now up to the politicians to decide how close the future defence cooperation between the two countries will be. He stresses that the proposal does not include the controversy of Norway’s choice of a new generation of fighter planes.

Nettavisen asked Diesen in the interview whether he suspects there will be problems in NATO because of the proposal. Diesen responded that it is unproblematic for a NATO member like Norway and an EU member like Sweden to work closely together. He also mentioned that Sweden is already a member of NATO’s partner organisation ‘Partnership 228for Peace’ (PfP). He further stressed that Sweden is already in a process of adapting to NATO standards in a number of areas. He did not anticipate that there would be practical problems because of the proposed cooperation, as each country would have full control over its own defence.

Nettavisen then asked Diesen to be more precise on the issue of ‘common military doctrines’. Diesen answered:

Interestingly, he did not comment on the fact that Norway and Sweden both contribute to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Neither the journalists nor Diesen touched upon the historical fact that before Norway joined NATO, Sweden had suggested the establishment of a Nordic defence alliance as a possible alternative solution for Norway and Denmark. This suggestion played a major role in the public debate prior to Norway’s decision to join NATO (Furre 1991). Many people on the left saw this as the preferred solution for Norway. Bjørgulv Braanen, the editor of the left-wing newspaper Klassekampen, also made a point of this in his commentary on 4 September, stating that it is a ‘tragedy that the plans for a joint Nordic defence cooperation [were] smashed after [WWII] by US-loyal top-politicians who preferred membership in NATO’. Klassekampen’s position is a dissenting voice in the Norwegian media landscape.

There is not enough space here to elaborate on the responses from the readers in Nettavisen. Let it suffice here to mention that 12 different contributions covered a number of issues. Several of the comments touched upon historical facts in the relationship between Sweden and Norway, contrary to the elite discourse (for more details, see Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2010). None of the contributions mentioned the fact that 229Norway and Sweden are fighting together in Afghanistan, as US allies in the ISAF forces under NATO leadership, in the ‘war on terror’. This fact, so vital for the future of GWOT, was not mentioned by Nettavisen, Diesen or any of the discussants.

Empirical example 2: Swedish media

When the commanders-in-chief of Norway and Sweden publicly presented the plans for increased military collaboration, they used the format of a debate article in the leading quality newspaper Dagens Nyheter (DN) under the headline: ‘New defence cooperation between Sweden and Norway’ (DN 31 August 2007). As mentioned above, the article argues using general and vague language that old sovereignty ideas must be forgotten, and the text is intended to help the readers forget. Two themes are totally absent in the article – themes that would be entirely relevant to the historical-political substance of the matter. These are:

The semantic manoeuvres that the two commanders use, clearly intended to avoid the latter issue, is fascinating as an attempt not to raise concerns about possible conflict risks at the tangent of the far-reaching cooperation plans. Consequently throughout the article they use abstract and imprecise expressions when touching upon what kind of military joint venture that may come in the future: ‘Euro-Atlantic security co-operation’, ‘the international community (UN/EU/NATO)’, ‘international peace operations’, etc.

Since the proposed military cooperation is said to include 18 areas, only five of which are specified in the article, it is reasonable to expect that the collaboration will be extended to other NATO members. This, 230however, is not a theme of the article. On the contrary, it is quite remarkable how one-sided and emphatic it is when emphasising that freedom of action will grow out of the two-way cooperation.

In the subsequent media coverage of the proposed cooperation, silence, or consensus, are the predominant responses. The debate is mentioned in the news, but without reference to any crucial questions or critical comments by media personnel themselves or from the public. The leading tabloid Aftonbladet reports briefly about the main content of the proposal, with some quotations from the article – but no further comments or commentators are given a platform. The implication of closer cooperation with NATO as a military alliance is remarkably absent in this Social-Democratic newspaper. Curiously, while three Norwegian newspapers ran editorials, commenting on the proposal, none of them reported it in their news pages. Two of them were positive about the cooperation (Trønderavisen and Bergens Tidende), while Nationen was more neutral (all of them published on 1 September 2007).

However, the foreign editor of the Dagens Nyheter provided a comment. On the editorial pages, the newspaper has for a number of years proposed that Sweden should apply for NATO membership. The plans for Swedish–Norwegian military cooperation provided the foreign editor with an occasion to once more criticise the reluctance of the politicians to spell out in public what changes have actually taken place in the Swedish defence policy. The editorial’s headline, ‘Open door to NATO’, indicates that the defence collaboration should naturally be followed up with a Swedish NATO membership application. Nevertheless, this is not something the editor expects to happen, primarily because left-wing politicians will continue their opposition given that ‘there are only political losses to be made in a situation where the overwhelming majority of the Swedes are opponents to an application’. This ‘remarkable’ policy will continue, according to the editor:

231He argues that it would be more honest to be forthrightly spoken, but does not express much hope of that, writing: ‘what is happening is going to happen anyway’.

In an analytical comment on the proposal of defence cooperation in Dagens Nyheter on the same day (31 August 2007), Ewa Sternberg claimed that Swedish defence policy is changing in spite of public opinion: ‘An alliance with Nordic neighbour-countries does not need to be perceived so negatively. Even if the co-operation with Oslo will bring us closer to Washington … In the future there may be a Finnish army, a Swedish airforce and a Norwegian navy in Scandinavia’.

In conclusion, the Swedish media discourse on the defence cooperation is constructed as a non-controversial and un-politicised issue, although one commentator did mention that it will tie Sweden closer to NATO. Otherwise, the rhetoric of the article signed by the two commanders seems to have been uncritically accepted, as though the proposed plans are simply the natural next steps on a road already chosen, and as if economic gains and operational improvements are the only objectives involved. The only critical point raised was when DN once again repeated its complaints that the Social-Democrats had not acknowledged in public that they had long since agreed to increased collaboration with NATO. That there could be any conflict-risks involved in becoming militarily engaged in the GWOT in Afghanistan or elsewhere was not mentioned in the Swedish discourse.

The debate on a joint defence revisited

In the summer of 2008, the heads of defence in Sweden and Norway picked up the debate again, this time including the head of defence in Finland. In a joint article, Sverre Diesen, Håkan Syrén and Juhani Kaskela suggested a joint Nordic defence system (Aftenposten 18 June 2008).

They referred to the article by Diesen and Syrén in August 2007 and stated that many of the suggestions had been discussed further. They mention a joint report presented to the ministers of defence in Norway, Sweden and Finland, where 140 suggestions for mutual defence cooperation had been identified. Out of these, they suggested 232that 40 could be implemented immediately. Among these are: ‘maritime surveillance; surveillance of the airspace; mutual land forces; common areas for practice; mutual Nordic bases for sea, air, and land support; medical support; and military education’.

The main argument centres on the budget cuts experienced by the permanent forces in the three countries. The alternatives are mutual cooperation or capacity reductions. The reason for these cut backs are presented subtly. The doxa linked to Nordic participation in GWOT is as obscure here as it is in the article from August 2007. The issue is only indirectly dealt with in the beginning of the article: ‘Most countries in the Euro-Atlantic area have gone through huge reorganisation to prepare their defence to deal with increasingly complex tasks nationally and internationally’.

When reading the whole report, the aim to coordinate joint efforts on GWOT is more clearly expressed. In point 42.2 in the document, the following rationale is stated clearly:

Another way to put this, which is not pointed out in the media, is that the military capacity of all the Nordic countries has been reduced because resources have been drained as a result of participation as allies to the US in the GWOT in Afghanistan and Iraq. The question is whether the general public in the Nordic countries would have agreed to this trade-off and this use of military and economic resources if the choice had been presented to them in a frank and open manner. In the Swedish defence debate, the huge and often badly calculated costs for international military engagements have been hot potatoes for the government. Large parts of the Swedish defence industry have been bought up by US capital during recent decades, and the international collaboration in the GWOT seems to be the reason for continuing to spend large amounts of taxpayers’ money on the defence sector. At the same time, it is the lever that will eventually dispose of the traditional non-alignment policy of both Finland and Sweden.233

The controversy over the Joint Strike Fighter

On 20 November 2008, the Norwegian Parliament, after a short debate, made a decision to buy the US Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) as Norway’s future fighter plane. The decision was arrived at after a long process in which the Swedish Saab Gripen plane was also a candidate. This debate was highly relevant to the other debate on closer Nordic defence cooperation. The Swedish government was involved in the marketing efforts to try to convince Norwegian politicians to choose the Swedish plane. Included in the proposed contract was a comprehensive plan for industrial, economical and military cooperation. A Norwegian decision to buy the Swedish plane would obviously have been an important step in strengthening Nordic cooperation. It would also have meant a more independent role for Norway within the US–Norwegian relationship and NATO. This issue was also controversial within the coalition government since the Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV: the socialist left party) was in favour of the Swedish/Nordic solution while the Arbeiderpartiet (AP: the social democrats) supported the US JSF solution.

When the decision was made, it was met with disbelief from the Swedish Government and the Swedish media. The Swedish media and politicians had problems understanding the Norwegian decision since the Swedish Gripen plane, according to their estimates, would have been cheaper and one important step towards a stronger Nordic defence cooperation. In Norway the public debate and the media coverage was confusing since the government spokespersons insisted that the JSF solution was both cheaper and more suitable in terms of Norway’s military commitments in international operations.

Once again the doxa of the mainstream media makes it almost impossible to confront the political and military elite on major issues, and the debate in Swedish and Norwegian media was reduced to a nationalistic quarrel between two neighbours (for further details, see Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2010). Both in Sweden and Norway, the unifying strategic interests indicate that both intend to continue as partners in arms on the battlefields in Afghanistan under US command, which, therefore, is not an issue in this debate.234

Conclusions

The peace journalism model as suggested by Johan Galtung is a useful tool as a checklist both for journalists and peace researchers. Since Galtung’s approach is somewhat rigid, though, it has its obvious limitations and should thus be supplemented with other methods and theories. We suggest that Bourdieu’s notion of doxa and the CDA approach could provide appropriate supplements. Although the question of audiences as active contributors to public discourse on war and peace has been addressed in some recent research, this chapter argues that a more sophisticated theoretical point of view would help bring the debate to a more reflexive level of understanding of the achievements and limits of the ‘PJ program’ (Kempf 2007, p4). The CDA approach to media studies incorporates levels of meanings and the relations between different actors in the discourse analysis as part of the context. The public debates in society have influences on media texts as do the discourses among politicians, PR firms and spin doctors, and vice versa. In particular, the CDA perspective helps to explore in what ways mediated discourses are interrelated with, for example, national and transnational security-policy discourses. In the empirical examples touched upon above, the silence around certain critical aspects of the plans for closer military cooperation between Finland, Norway and Sweden, and the hidden assumptions concerning the wider context of the US-led GWOT, are some such important – though discursively absent – inter-discursive relations.

Our point is that this silence about potential conflict risks and possible involvement in future wars is not accounted for in Galtung’s model for war and peace journalism. On the contrary, by ignoring the potential conflict risks that may be contingent of deeper involvement in the GWOT, the journalistic examples above could in some respects be categorised as ‘peace journalism’, and in others as ‘war journalism’. For example, although a common Nordic peaceful identity is appealed to, there is no opposition identity or enemy image mentioned. Further, there is an emphasis on preventing future wars – although by military means. On the other hand – and this would place the coverage in the war journalism category – the proposal of increased Nordic cooperation 235in the defence sector is making potential conflict risks ‘opaque and secret’, it is ‘elite oriented’, and it definitely does not ‘uncover all cover-ups’ (Galtung 2002). In addition we claim that the great variety of positions and points of view among the public, as demonstrated in our empirical examples, does not fit within either the war column or the peace column in Galtung’s model. The elite positions in Galtung’s war model are represented by the military and the politicians, but the ways in which they systematically avoid mentioning conflict risks, which may facilitate a process toward military conflict escalation, is not considered by the model. The reason for this is mainly because the Galtung model is limited in its reference to media coverage of open war. We on the other hand, would like to draw attention to the need to expand analysis to the previous stages in conflict escalation processes.

The discourse among ordinary people, though, might pick up historical links like the suggestion after the Second World War of a Nordic solution as an alternative to NATO for the Scandinavian countries. It might also mention possible scenarios other than those promoted by the elites. New digital media offers an opportunity for the public to put forward positions in opposition to the mainstream media (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2010). In any case, we suggest that the multi-media landscape with its different discursive spaces should certainly have a place in the future debate on peace journalism.

Models such as Galtung’s are probably not relevant in all conflict situations and stages. Used as a tool for assessing the journalistic contributions to conflict resolutions, they are not without problems because they are generalised and not properly contextualised. At the same time, it must be recognised that there is plenty of empirical evidence that much of the war reporting in mainstream media is constructed along the lines Galtung suggests. By using CDA as a supplement, we suggest that a more comprehensive analysis is possible. Such an analysis would examine both the systematic silencing of certain crucial aspects as well as promote the voices of ordinary people in public discourses on war and peace issues, with the objective of discovering the complex elements that comprise discursive constructions and structures that contribute to conflict escalation and wars.236

We recommend the following as concluding points: