For many Australian historians the history of the northern parts of Australia has largely remained terra incognita, the poor relation of the political and economic growth which began and flourished in the south-east and which in many respects has not yet managed to conquer the vast spaces of the north and north-west. Between 1824 and the foundation of Darwin in 1869, abortive attempts were made to settle Melvi1le Island, Raffles Bay, Port Essington, Escape Cliffs, Camden Harbour, and Somerset near Cape York, as well as some minor settlements (Macknight 1969b:12–21). Of these, Port Essington is remembered, not so much because it was the longest-lived of these attempts, nor because it bore witness to extreme privation and mismanagement on the part of a distant government, but rather because the settlement was the destination of Ludwig Leichhardt on his epic journey across the continent from Moreton Bay, in 1844–5. Port Essington, however, forms an important chapter in Great Britain’s attempts to control this ‘fifth quarter of the globe’, both politically and physically.

Historians have outlined a number of reasons for this settlement. Briefly these include the opening up of trade between the north coast and the East Indies to develop tropical agriculture on a commercial scale (Howard 1925-6:60); to prevent piracy in the Eastern Archipelago (McIntosh 1958:441); to prevent a rumoured French expedition to the area from taking possession (CO 201/153: Barrow to Horton 22.1.1824); to establish a haven for ships wrecked in Torres Strait (Earl 1836; Adm. 2/1695: Adam and Parker to Stanley 30.1.1838) and as a base for surveying voyages in the area (Campbell 1834:180). The present chapter attempts to assess these reasons.

When the Alligator sailed into Port Essington in October 1838, all eyes must have been turned to the silent shore which was to become their home for some time. But for the commander of the expedition, Sir James John Gordon Bremer, the experience must also have recalled his first arrival at Port Essington 14 years before, when he attempted to make the first British settlement, which he eventually established on Melville Island. In many respects this new attempt was a continuation of Melville Island and its sister colony of Raffles Bay and it is necessary to turn firstly to these earlier failures.

Melville Island and Raffles Bay

The background history to the foundation of settlements at Melville Island and Raffles Bay is long and detailed and has been effectively covered elsewhere by Howard (1932–3). Briefly, the movement of the English East India Company into the eastern section of the Indian Archipelago, with the settlement at Balambangan in 1774, threw the British into close commercial rivalry with the Dutch and led to a series of essentially commercial treaties between the two nations. The first of these, in 1784 opened up trade to the British and resulted in the purchase of Penang.

During the Napoleonic Wars the British began a conquest of the Dutch East Indies (Howard 1931–2:43), ostensibly to counteract Napoleon’s conquest of the Netherlands. Between 1811 and 1816 Java and its dependencies came under the governorship of Sir Stamford Raffles, whose rule quickly fostered British commercial interests in the area. But such interests were dealt a severe blow by the restoration of these territories in 1816, under the terms of the Treaty of 1814 between Great Britain and Holland. The Dutch quickly reestablished themselves in Borneo, the Celebes, Sumatra and the Moluccas, and by a system of selective tariffs proceeded to exclude as far as possible British commerce in the Eastern Archipelago. One successful British answer came with the establishment of Singapore by Raffles in 1819, and following upon its early success, arose the plan for a similar commercial emporium on the north coast of Australia.

As might be expected, this new focus for British commerce was the suggestion of a private trader, William Barnes (sometimes ‘Barns’) who had originally been in the employ of the East India Company and subsequently had spent the four years prior to 1823 trading between the Moluccas and New South Wales (CO 201/153: East India Trade Committee to Bathurst 21.1.1824). Despite Darling’s later assertion that Barnes was a man without principle and totally unworthy of notice (HRA I xiii:796), the comparison drawn between him and James Matra is fair comment on Barnes and the originality of his idea (Graham 1967:406). Barnes’ initial communication with the Colonial Office was a calculated endeavour to attract attention to his scheme on two fronts, firstly the commercial advantages to be derived from a settlement on the northern coast and secondly the aggressive expansion of the Dutch in the general area. ‘I have to state’, he added as incentive, ‘a disgraceful abuse of the British flag on the part of the Dutch Government against the natives of the Molucca Islands’ (CO 201/146: Barnes to Bathurst 23.7.1823).

As Howard has pointed out, Barnes’ early career in the Eastern Archipelago had been in the halcyon years of Raffles’ rule in Java and he had witnessed the subsequent restrictions on British trade in the region upon the return of the Dutch. Thus this point was re-emphasised in Barnes’ second communication on the subject which the Colonial Office requested upon receipt of the first (CO 202/11: Horton to Barnes 28.8.1823). Pointing out that the British had no possession in the ‘valuable Eastern Islands’, and that the Dutch seemed bent on the total exclusion of their rivals in the advantages of the trade In the area, Barnes suggested a settlement in the Gulf of Carpentaria, with the aim of establishing contact with the trepang fishermen from Macassar (CO 201/146: Barnes to Horton 15.9.1823).

More will be said in the ensuing pages about these Macassans, who arrived on the Australian coast each year with the north-west monsoon, collected and cured the trepang and returned to the Celebes at the end of each season on the south-east trade wind. In addition to trepang and other luxury items which were destined for the Chinese market, a large internal trade, carried on by the Bugis resulted in about 30,000 tons of junk shipping entering ports in the Indian Archipelago each year (Bach 1958:223). Batavia, Manila, Macassar and Singapore formed the major entrepôts for this trade, and Barnes’ scheme was designed to intercept a proportion of it before it reached these ports. Both the internal and Chinese market trades involved a large number of items (Crawfurd 1820 III:184), and Barnes claimed that the trepang trade alone was worth an annual value of between £180,000 and £240,000 (CO 201/146: Barnes to Horton 15.9.1823) although this appears a gross over-estimate (Bach 1958:224). Calculating the value of trepang at forty Spanish dollars per picul, and the average cargo at 5 tons per prau, one hundred praus in one season could only net £68,000. All these figures are high and 106the actual average return from the Australian part of the trade would almost certainly be less than half this figure. The most exact figures available show that the total amount of trepang exported from Macassar in 1824 was valued at £28,000 (Macknight 1969a).

Barnes’ letter closed urging the establishment of an immediate settlement, ‘especially as the Dutch are most anxious to form one themselves in the hope of shutting us out from the trade of the Eastern World and totally excluding us from all their ports’ (CO 201/146: Barnes to Horton 15.9.1823).

Barnes’ proposal had also come to the attention of the East India Trade Committee, an organisation of traders existing apparently to consider the interests of British merchants in the East (Howard 1931–2:76). In a letter signed by the Chairman of the Committee to Horton, Barnes’ scheme was reiterated in some detail, and its implementation strongly recommended (CO 201/144: Begbie to Horton 13.12.1823). One significant alteration was suggested, however, that having consulted Captain Phillip Parker King, the Committee felt that Port Essington should be the site for such a settlement. King had recently returned to England after completing an initial survey along the north coast, extending that done by Flinders in 1803. King had named the Cobourg Peninsula after Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg. (The misspelling to Cobourg occurred in the published account of the voyage (King 1827 I:98).) King also named Port Essington, presumably after Admiral Sir William Essington, and wrote of it in glowing terms.

Fearing the Dutch might precipitate their proposed settlement once the results of King’s surveys became known, the Committee urged prompt action. Bathurst therefore sought the opinion of the Admiralty, and the reply from John Barrow, at that time Second Secretary, decided the point. Barrow had spoken already to King and stated his acceptance of the commercial arguments in favour of the proposal. His main argument, however, was that the Dutch might be justified in establishing themselves in northern Australia despite any British claims to prior ‘discovery’ in the same manner as they themselves had taken possession of the east coast and Tasmania, while not disputing that the Dutch had made the original discovery, and that in this matter the conduct of the British might be quoted against themselves (CO 201/153: Barrow to Horton 22.1.1824). Thirteen years later, he was again to use this argument in favour of the resettling of Port Essington (CO 201/256: Barrow to Glenelg 13.12.1836). In February 1824, Bathurst wrote to Governor Brisbane (CO 202/10: Bathurst to Brisbane 17.2.1824) issuing the necessary instructions and on 24 August 1824, the Tamar and the Countess of Harcourt under the command of Bremer and accompanied by the colonial vessel Lady Nelson sailed from Sydney. Arriving at Port Essington, Bremer was unable to locate sufficient water, and after taking formal possession moved to Melville Island. Nevertheless, he wrote of the Port as one of the most noble and beautiful pieces of water imaginable, capable of ‘containing a whole Navy in perfect security’ (HRA III v:769–71). On 30 September the site of Fort Dundas was occupied. When Bremer departed in November, the detachment consisted of 112 men, 2 including the crew of the Lady Nelson (Howard 1931–2:83).

The history of the Melville Island settlement, and the sister settlement of Fort Wellington at Raffles Bay on the Cobourg Peninsula can be quickly passed over here (see Howard 1931–2; Graham 1967; McIntosh 1958; Bach 1958). Melville Island proved an unqualified failure and the settlement was removed in 1829 to Raffles Bay, where Fort Wellington had been established in 1827. However by the end of 1829 orders arrived for the abandonment of this second settlement also.

A number of reasons can be put forward to explain these failures. Bremer’s passionate praise for Melville Island and its potential, in a despatch written barely six weeks after their arrival (CO 201/155: Bremer to Bathurst 12.11.1824) caused Barrow to state that there never was so promising a spot in a naval, commercial and agricultural point of view (CO 201/164: Barrow to Horton 30.4.1825). Despite this, Bremer’s choice of a site was in every respect disastrous. Situated in Apsley Strait, Fort Dundas was removed from the sea-lanes, and the strait itself proved difficult to navigate (Blainey 1966:85). The monotony of everyday life was emphasised by the inhospitable nature of the country and by 1826 both the Lady Nelson and the brig Stedcombe, sent as a trading vessel to the settlement by the East India Trade Committee and captained by Barnes, had been lost to pirates, although Barnes was not on board at the time. The gloom of the despatches arriving in England during 1826 was strongly felt, but rather than abandon the plan completely it was determined to try again at Raffles Bay (Howard 1931–2:86). The basis for this second attempt appears to have been the failure to establish contact with the Macassans who by-passed Melville Island completely on their voyages to the Australian mainland (although I have collected Macassan pottery at Fort Dundas). Contact with Macassans did take place at Raffles Bay, but late in 1829, when prospects of trade appeared most likely, the settlement was abandoned.

This situation underlines the thesis of the difficulty of communications which has been stressed elsewhere by Blainey who points out that Fort Dundas was as marooned ‘as a beetle in a bottle’ (1966:88). However other events had taken place which lessened the opportunities for successful trade. The treaty between Great Britain and Holland signed in London in 1824 had ensured the security of Singapore and, at least on paper, had given access to British traders in the eastern ports of the archipelago controlled by the Dutch (Howard 1931–2:60-3). Thus, after the loss of the Stedcombe the London merchants who had asked for the north Australian settlements failed to make use of them. When, in the season of 1828-29, 34 Macassan praus visited Raffles Bay there was little to be traded with them in what was essentially a military establishment (Blainey 1966:87–8; Graham 1967:419; RGS: Barker).

With one exception, the successive commandants of the two settlements appear to have been singularly inept at their tasks. Captain Laws reported that the governorship fell to whoever’s ‘turn it was for detached duty’ without reference to the man’s habits, interest or inclination. One commandant at Melville Island had almost resigned his commission rather than take such a posting, and following his arrival he had never ventured more than half a mile from his house (CO 201/264: Report 25.10.1828 in Barrow and Beaufort to Glenelg 10.4.1837). Captain Smyth, the first commanding officer at Raffles Bay, also accepted his post unwillingly, and following the first wet season during which almost the whole garrison fell ill, he gained his recall on the grounds of ill-health (Howard 1931–2:87). But from the first his despatches were depressing, denying any value in the settlement and their subsequent arrival in England sealed the fate of Raffles Bay (e.g. CO 2201/191: Smyth to Darling 30.10.1827).

Smyth, however, did make contact with the Macassan trepangers and set in motion efforts at establishing the trade that had placed the first British settlement in the area more than three years before. He wrote to the Governor of Macassar and to an English merchant reported to be living there (HRA III vi:806). However the reply, received from the Dutch Governor by the later commandant, Captain Collet Barker was not encouraging (HRA III vi:821).

With Barker’s arrival in September 1828 came the first conscientious leadership seen in either of the two settlements. Sturt compared Barker’s character with that of James Cook 107(ADB I:57), and his career marked him as a zealous and honest soldier. To Raffles Bay he brought an energetic approach which guided the settlement through the rigours of the 1828-29 wet season. He quickly improved the housing of his garrison and extended the supply of fresh vegetables with close attendance to the gardens. Barker appreciated the need for discipline and curbed drunkenness with drilling and theft with the lash (ML A2002: Barker Journal 20.4.1829). He did not merely adhere blindly to regulations however, and with a regard for the climate, allowed some relaxation in the dress of his men (ML A2002: Barker Journal 29.10.1828). This was an important consideration in the oppressive climate.

Barker’s greatest success was with the Aborigines. Both settlements had been witness to bloody skirmishes with loss of life on both sides, and these encounters had culminated in December 1827 with Smyth offering £5 per head for any Aborigines brought into the settlement for the purpose of attempting to pacify them. A party of six men located a group of some 60 Aborigines camped on a beach in Bowen Strait and without warning opened fire upon them. In the ensuing struggle a man and woman were bayonetted and some of the wounded took refuge in the sea where they were slaughtered. The bounty-hunters returned to the settlement with a wounded girl who was promptly renamed Mary Waterloo Raffles (HRA III vi:781–9 records the ensuing enquiry in Sydney).

Barker set out to rectify the animosity which had grown between the two groups and he records that on sighting some Aborigines on 2 December he left the boat and advanced alone and unarmed until he was able to exchange gifts with one of them (ML A2002: Barker Journal 2.12.1828). Barker was later to effect a similar conciliation with hostile Aborigines at King George’s Sound, and it is ironical that he was speared to death at the mouth of the Murray in 1831 in similar circumstances.

The honesty of Barker’s dealings with the Macassans is also evident from his journal. While forbidding them the right to make a punitive expedition against the Aborigines of Raffles Bay for an alleged offence elsewhere on the coast (ML A2002: Barker Journal 2.4.1829), Barker went to great lengths to welcome and encourage the Macassans and discussed the sorts of goods they might expect to exchange. The Macassans desired cotton cloth and handkerchiefs, scissors, knives, razors, saws, files, chisels, needles and thread, and particularly opium.

While they themselves did not want powder and muskets they thought there might be a market for such goods in Macassar. In exchange they could bring gold dust, spices, nutmeg and cinnamon, tortoise shell, rice and tobacco. One captain informed Barker that there were 60 or 70 praus on the coast that year and there was a general enthusiasm for the possibilities of trade (ML A2002: Barker Journal 24.3.1829 and 1.4.1829).

We can only speculate on how successful this trade might have been. Trepang had been the linchpin of Barnes’ original scheme, and Smyth had discovered the previous season that the trepangers would not sell this commodity, stating that their proprietors in Macassar were already committed to Chinese merchants in that port (Bach 1958:229 and fn 36). A similar situation was to occur throughout the lifetime of Port Essington, and it seems unlikely that an economic market could have been set up with the Macassans without trepang as the major commodity (CO 201/320: Stokes to Gipps 20.12.1841). With the settlement flourishing, the disappointment of having to abandon it caused Barker to hesitate, until he recollected that ‘obedience was better than sacrifice’, whereupon he carried out the orders (Wilson 1835:172; see also CO 201/320: Stokes to Gipps 19.3.1842). It was typical of his thoughtfulness that he wrote to Admiral Gage asking that the Governor of Macassar be notified that the British had left Raffles Bay so that traders would not be inconvenienced the following year (Wilson 1835:172). According to a later account praus did arrive to trade and settle and were disappointed to find the British gone (Earl 1836:27, see also CO 201/257: Earl to Glenelg 27.5.1836; CO 201/286: Bremer to Admiralty 4.3.1839).

The lessons of Melville Island and Raffles Bay

These early failures underlined a number of difficulties peculiar to the settlement of tropical north Australia, its remoteness and the difficulty of communications, the lack of experience of the men who tried to establish such garrisons, the sorts of privation and sickness they were to endure – scurvy, dysentery, malaria and other minor ailments being common. While subsistence gardens could be made productive, the hope of any real agricultural successes was gone, apart from such commodities as lignum vitae, a timber prized for ship building and repairing. The real nature and difficulty of trying to tap the trade of the Eastern Archipelago via the Macassans should have been realised, but this lesson was still to be learnt. Finally and significantly, Europeans attempting to settle a tropical environment, for the first time had been thrown together with an indigenous race of hunters and gatherers, and who, even if friendly, could not provide the plentiful labour source so necessary to European colonisation of the tropics, and who could not regularly supply food beyond their own needs with which any European settlement might sustain itself. What lessons the Aborigines who had lived in the area for the last 20–30,000 years might have to teach, perished on the intellects of those who saw them, like Dampier, as the ‘miserablest People in the World’ (Dampier 1927 [1697]:312). This opinion still was in vogue in some quarters in the nineteenth and even the twentieth centuries (Mulvaney 1958:135 and passim).

Thus with scarcely a whimper came the end of the first two settlements on Australia’s northern shores and a somewhat chastened government gratefully accepted the announcement from the Secretary for War and the Colonies that the abandonment of Melville Island and Raffles Bay had saved the government £761 per annum, exclusive of the costs of communicating with the settlements (HRA I xvi:395). But while the idea was effectively dead it would not lie down and less than four months after Goderich’s announcement, Hay was writing to Governor Bourke blaming Darling for acting precipitously in recommending the abandonment and advocating a further attempt at settling Port Essington (ML A1269: Hay to Bourke 21.1.1832; see also Bach 1958:232).

1829–1838. Arguments for a new attempt to settle north Australia: George Windsor Earl

In 1834 Major Campbell, a former commandant of Melville Island, delivered a long address to the Royal Geographical Society on his experiences in North Australia and the natural resources of the area (Campbell 1834:129–181). Despite the unfavourable nature of his despatches when he was there in an official capacity, he argued strongly for the commercial capabilities of the Cobourg Peninsula. ‘Port Essington’ he said ‘is as the friendly hand of Australia, stretched out towards the north, openly inviting the scattered islanders of the Javanese, Malayan, Celebean, and Chinese seas, to take shelter and rest in its secure, extensive and placid harbour; where they may deposit the productions of their native inter-tropical isles, and receive in exchange the more improved manufactures of the natives of the temperate zone’ (1834:177). Campbell also stressed the military importance of the area, and its value as a base for surveying work. 108

In 1836 the Colonist newspaper (3.1.1836 and 26.5.1836) made several references to the probable settlement of the north coast suggesting that in the first instance it would be a depot for convicts, an idea more fully propounded in 1837 by John Dunmore Lang in Transportation and Colonization, who argued that if it was necessary to settle Port Essington then it was ‘surely fitting and reasonable that these hardships, difficulties and diseases should be encountered and surmounted by transported felons, rather than by a free emigrant population’ (Lang 1837:194–200 and esp. 199). In the same year came an eloquent rebuttal of the idea of using convicts for settling Port Essington. George Windsor Earl (1837:461) observed that ‘sufficient sin and misery have already been created by Britain vomiting forth her outcasts to people a country well deserving of a better system of colonisation’.

The appearance of Earl introduces a major figure in the history of Port Essington, and one whose subsequent absence in the pages of Australian history is not justified. Born in England in 1813, nothing is known of his early life, although it is apparent from his writings that Earl must have been well-educated, particularly in languages. During his life he translated articles from French, Dutch and Spanish, and appeared to be conversant with German. In addition he spoke several Malayan languages (Gibson-Hill 1959:105–6). Earl was a prolific writer and Gibson-Hill lists nine books or pamphlets in addition to 24 articles in learned journals in a bibliography of Earl’s work which is incomplete (e.g. Earl 1855). His subjects ranged from the physical geography of the Indian archipelago and trade in the Arafura Sea to the ethnology of the Papuan races, the first paper on a prehistoric site in Malaya, and the colonisation of north Australia. Earl was also a cartographer of some ability and the first chart of the Arafura Sea prepared by the Hydrographic Department bears his name (Chart 1088, Arafura Sea, Atlas 1/150,000,000, 1838.)

From the end of 1829 Earl was at Swan River and Port Augusta, a settlement near Cape Leeuwin (RGSA Earl Correspondence: Earl to Washington 3.2.1837 and 21.7.1838) and in August of 1832 he shipped on a Dutch schooner to Surabaya. Following his arrival in the archipelago Earl worked on a number of trading ships, finally commanding a profitable trading voyage in 1834 from Singapore to Borneo aboard the British schooner Stamford. After a second voyage in this vessel he returned to England, arriving in the early part of 1835. This phase of his life is recorded in Earl’s best and best-known work, The Eastern Seas (1837) and it provided him with much factual material for his agitation for a commercial emporium an the north coast of Australia.

A considerable number of documents are available to trace Earl’s campaign in this matter and these reflect both the man’s enthusiasm for his scheme and the depth of first hand information that he possessed to argue his case. However his single-mindedness shows through to a degree which sometimes borders upon the dishonest and which makes understandable the varying opinions of his character. Bremer pressed strongly for the inclusion of Earl in the subsequent expedition, arguing for ‘so able and scientific a person’ (RGSA: Bremer to Washington 30.9.1837). An anonymous visitor to Port Essington described him as a highly intelligent young man, ‘most warm and sanguine in the well-doing of the colony’ (Anon. 1842a). Sir Thomas Mitchell however disliked his ‘pragmatical notions’, and carried no opinion of him as an authority on anything other than the resources and population of the Indian Archipelago (ML A3599: Mitchell to King 18.12.1844).

A subsequent event cast Earl in a bad light. Upon his return to Sydney from England in 1846 to resume his post at Port Essington, instead of waiting for a certain passage on a vessel going to Port Essington from Sydney, he travelled to Singapore via China in an attempt to get to Port Essington that way. He became stranded in Singapore for all of 1847 and 1848, during which time he drew Bills of Exchange on the Government for half-pay, a procedure totally contrary to regulations and which the Government seriously considered not honouring (CO 201/421: unsigned minute on Earl to Grey 19.3.1849). The situation was overcome shortly after; when Port Essington was abandoned, Earl was allowed his half-pay to the end of 1849 in lieu of any compensation for the loss of his post (CO 201/421: Earl to Hawes 4.9.1849). As Elliot tersely remarked however, ‘I do not know that a clearer condemnation could be pronounced on Port Essington, than that one of its warmest Advocates, well acquainted with the Eastern Seas, would have consumed more than two years in a fruitless attempt to find an opportunity of reaching the place’ (CO 201/424: Elliot to Merrivale, minute on Earl to Treasury 19.3.1849). Such was the elusive nature of Earl’s character.

According to Gibson-Hill (1959:105), Earl was accepted in English society at about the same level as James Brooke. Upon his return to England in 1835 he became a member of the Royal Asiatic Society and later became one of the first Corresponding Members of the Ethnological Society. Gibson-Hill questioned why Earl never joined the Royal Geographical Society despite a close association – he addressed two meetings of that Society early in 1837 and again in 1845 and published a number of times in their journal. From correspondence now at hand it would appear that Earl did not have the most cordial relations with all members of that Society. In 1852 he had printed an open letter to Lord Colchester complaining of errors in a paper published by the Society, which failed to notice the address delivered by himself in 1845 (RGSA Earl Correspondence: Earl to Colchester 10.4.1852). Speaking further of this matter in a letter to Beaufort, Earl complained that

Earl still felt this slight when he wrote to Dr Norton Shaw in 1859 (RGSA Earl Correspondence: Earl to Shaw 6.5.1859).

Thus one sees Earl in 1836 as a young intelligent and capable man, dogmatic, and with a singleness of purpose which enabled him to make enemies as well as friends. Above all, however, he alone possessed the experience and first-hand knowledge to pursue the venture to which he now turned; the establishment of a third British emporium on the north coast of Australia.

In April 1836, Earl wrote to the Colonial Office enquiring whether the Government had any intention of forming a settlement on the north coast (CO 201/257: Earl to Under Secretary of State 23.4.1836). The answer informed him that no such settlement was contemplated (CO 202/35: Grey to Earl 27.4.1836), and upon receipt of this, Earl forwarded his plan (CO 201/257: Earl to Glenelg 27.5.1836). This took the form of his first published work, a 47 page pamphlet entitled Observations on the Commercial and Agricultural Capabilities of the North Coast of New Holland and the Advantages to be Derived from the establishment of a 109Settlement in the Vicinity of Raffles Bay (Earl 1836). The first part of this pamphlet is given over to an examination of the earlier settlements and the reasons for their failure, and Earl came to the conclusion that the hasty departure from Raffles Bay had eclipsed a successful venture. The author then argued the value of a new settlement. It would be a place of refuge for ships lost in Torres Strait, and a resort for English whalers in the area, which at that time were using the Dutch port of Koupang in Timor. In addition Earl touched on the strategic value of the area. But the bulk of his argument rested on the commercial potential of such a settlement. He claimed that trepang, tortoise shell, sago and timber could be procured there. But whereas Barnes’ original plan had been to intercept the trepang collected by the Macassans, Earl emphasised instead the commercial potential of the neighbouring islands, Bali, Lombok, Java, and also the Kai and Aru Islands and New Guinea to the north. In addition a direct trade to the China markets could be anticipated. Labour could be procured cheaply from the islands, and independent Chinese and Buginese traders might be expected to settle (1836:12-14).

Earl undoubtedly felt that such a scheme could succeed and marshalled a large number of statistics to substantiate his arguments. However, he seems to have seriously underestimated the power of the Dutch over the native producers and he certainly played down the difficulties of procuring native labour, of which he was aware (Earl 1837:335-6 fn). The reply from the Colonial Office merely thanked him (CO 2202/35:Grey to Earl 30.5.1836), and a less resourceful person may have been inclined to pursue the matter no further.

However, events favoured Earl. For the remainder of 1836 he appears to have been working on his book The Eastern Seas, but at the end of that year the Royal Geographical Society became involved in promoting an expedition to the north-west of Australia. It should be recalled that the amount of influence societies of this nature possessed at this time was extreme, and recommendations which they made very often received more attention than the amount of knowledge behind them warranted. The Royal Geographical Society was no exception in possessing such influence and although it had only come into being in 1830 it numbered many influential men among its members. Its first president had been Viscount Goderich, the then Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. An instigator of the Society and an enthusiastic supporter of it was Sir John Barrow, who throughout the period under review was Second Secretary to the Admiralty. Barrow was a man who had favoured the earlier attempts to settle north Australia.

At the end of November 1836 the Society wrote to the Colonial Office with the proposal for an expedition to the area (CO 201/256: Washington to Glenelg 30.11.1836) and it is a mark of their influence that not only was the plan found acceptable but that the Treasury agreed to obtain a vote of £1000 from Parliament for it, to be handed to the Society to allocate (CO 201/256: Spearman to Stephen 31.1.1837). The subsequent expedition was led by Lieutenant (later Sir George) Grey (Grey 1841).

Earl must surely have heard of the expedition, and shortly after he sent John Washington, the secretary of the Royal Geographical Society, two long communications. The first of these, dated 3 February 1837, was a 33 page document entitled ‘Remarks on the Fittest Season for Examining the Coasts of Australia’ (RGSA Earl Correspondence: Earl to Washington 3.2.1837) and it gave a number of sources of ships and the weather they had experienced at various places and at various times. It stressed also the suitability of the Aru Islands as a potential source of supplies. The second communication, sent only four days later was entitled ‘Observations on the Colonization of North Australia’ (RGSA Earl Correspondence: Earl to Washington 7.2.1837). In general it reiterated the points Earl had made previously to the Colonial Office, but it is notable that Earl’s general knowledge of the area had already led him to believe that Bowen Strait might provide a better site than Port Essington. Based on information from Captain Laws, Earl now felt that Barker’s Bay opposite Croker Island held a number of advantages as a commercial site. With uncannily prophetic insight Earl listed the disadvantages of Port Essington which were to be underlined in the following years.

His farsightedness in this matter was later borne out by the fact that a revenue station was established in the 1880s to intercept the Macassans at the very spot in Bowen Strait which Earl had recommended.

On 24 April Earl again wrote to the Colonial Office, this time including the proofs of ‘Observations on the Commercial Resources of the Indian Archipelago’, the appendix to The Eastern Seas (Earl 1837; CO 201/226: Earl to Glenelg 24.4.1837). Although the answer merely said that Glenelg could not, ‘with propriety’ comment on the interesting suggestions it contained (CO 202/36: Grey to Earl 18.5.1837), the reply can be construed as more favourable than those that Earl had received in 1836. As Howard (1931–2:93) has pointed out the difference between Earl’s letters of 1836 and 1837 is that the former made almost no reference to Dutch antagonism towards English commerce, while the latter went to some lengths to underline it and the specific ways in which it was carried on (Earl 1837: 424 fn).

Sir John Barrow and the maintenance of British sovereignty in north Australia

However, by the time of Earl’s 1837 communication another factor had entered upon the scene. A fortnight before, Beaufort, Hydrographer at the Admiralty and a member of the Council of the Royal Geographical Society, had written to the Colonial Office, together with Barrow, apparently in answer to an enquiry from Glenelg on the necessity of re-establishing the north coast settlements (CO 201/264: Barrow and Beaufort to Glenelg 10.4.1837). This letter introduced a new aspect of the question, that of maintaining British sovereignty over all the Australian continent, and Barrow and Beaufort based their arguments for resettlement on the necessity of preventing both Dutch and French occupation. Barrow particularly seems to have feared French intervention in northern Australia, and it is possible that Glenelg’s initial enquiry arose from a letter addressed to him from Barrow in December 1836 in support of the proposed Grey expedition. Here Barrow spoke of two likely expeditions to the Pacific, one American, the other French, and wrote that ‘it would be a most humiliating mortification, to witness the tricoloured flag, or that of the Stripes and Stars waving on Dampier’s Land’ (CO 201/256: Barrow to Glenelg 13.12.1836; see also Earl 1837:461 for reference to the proposed French expedition). Later Barrow was to re-emphasise the need ‘to draw a ring-fence’ around the whole of the Australian coast (see Journal of the Royal Geographical Society 1839:500). James Stephen, the Colonial Secretary, although he was to excuse himself several years later (CO 201/302: minute on Barrow to Vernon Smith 26.12.1840), also shared this opinion and wrote of the ‘paramount importance of retaining a permanent possession of the entire coasts of Australia’ (CO 2201/164: Stephen to Wood Eyre 16.5.1837). In writing to Glenelg, Barrow and Beaufort stressed the need to take actual possession, rather than merely planting the flag, repeating almost word for word the exact argument Barrow had used to support the settlement of Melville Island (CO 201/164: Barrow and Beaufort to Glenelg 10.4.1837; compare CO 201/153: Barrow to Horton 22.1.1824). 110

The important point of this interdepartmental correspondence is that it was all based on the need to maintain political sovereignty of the Australian coast. Lip-service only was paid to the commercial arguments laboriously put forward by Earl. Throughout these and subsequent letters, once the general plan had been accepted, phrases repeatedly appeared such as ‘no time should be lost in considering what measures it may be most expedient to adopt’ (CO 201/264: Stephen to Wood Eyre 16.5.1837) or ‘I am afraid the plan will not bear much more delay, or we shall be forestalled’ (CO 201/264: Barrow to Stephen 17.7.1837) or ‘the Dutch have already got the start on us’ (CO 201/264: Barrow to Stephen 11.9.1837).

The Dutch certainly did have a start, possessing at least eight settlements between Singapore and New Guinea. Following the British settlement of Melville Island, a Dutch settlement had been made on the south-west coast of New Guinea in order to ‘check-mate’ the British (RGSA Earl Correspondence: Earl to Washington 16.8.1838) and it appeared that such expansion was to anticipate any development of northern Australia (Graham 1967:425).

It is difficult to estimate how real or imaginary the French threat was at this time. Earlier in the nineteenth century Westernport and Swan River had been established to forestall the French (Scott 1910:276), but most historians have not carried the examination beyond about 1830. Two pieces of evidence exist to support the reality of French intentions on north Australia at this time. Firstly the rumoured French expedition did take place under Commodore Dumont d’Urville in command of the Astrolabe and the Zelée. Of course there can be no suggestion that this voyage was anything other than of a scientific nature. However, after passing into the Pacific around Cape Horn, d’Urville did sail through Torres Strait, making eventually for Raffles Bay. Throughout their eight days stay there during which time the British informed them that the British settlement was merely around the corner, the time was spent making detailed surveys of both the Bay and the nearby Bowen Strait. It is possible that d’Urville had been ordered to investigate the area with a view to future occupation. The second piece of evidence is more tenuous. In 1875, Lord John Russell recounted that during his time at the Colonial Office (1839–1841) he was visited by ‘a gentleman attached to the French Government’. ‘He asked me how much of Australia was claimed as the dominion of Great Britain. I answered ‘the whole’, and with that answer he went away’ (Russell 1875:203).

Whether real or imaginary the fear of the French was a factor of extreme importance in the British moves to re-establish the north coast settlements, and it was only when application was made to the Treasury that the commercial arguments again came to the fore, with Stephen stressing the ‘expediency of forming some commercial settlements on the Northern Coast of New Holland’ (CO 202/36: Stephen to Spearman 28.7.1837). Because of the commercial nature of such settlements they could be established at a modest cost, but again because of the imminent danger of the French, Americans and Dutch no delay should be made in maturing plans for occupying such important positions. The letter suggested the employment of a small body of marines and convicts, and a small civil establishment, the salaries of which would total £1,465 per annum (CO 202/36: Stephen to Spearman 28.7.1837).

The financial administration of Port Essington

The first major set-back to the plans of Glenelg and Barrow came with the refusal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to go to Parliament with the estimates for the proposed settlement. He argued that all that was contemplated was a naval survey and whatever occupation which might be necessary to secure the post, that is to say, little more than a naval exercise (CO 201/302: unsigned minute on Barrow to Stephen 18.1.1840). Undeterred, Glenelg and Barrow pushed on without Treasury approval and created a situation which was largely to determine the eventual downfall of the settlement. Stephen was later to write, ‘The fact is that this was a favourite scheme of Sir John Barrow’s, and that in the original eagerness to accomplish it all financial difficulties were set aside, although they were fully perceived at the outset’ (CO 201/302: Stephen’s minute on Barrow to Stephen 6.6.1840).

Barrow had expected Port Essington to become a flourishing colony, but it remained officially under the control of the Admiralty and all claims were sent to that department. The Admiralty forwarded them to the Colonial Office, who, having no funds to meet them replied accordingly (CO 201/302: Stephen to Vernon Smith, minute on Barrow to Vernon Smith 26.12.1840). After lengthy discussions between these two departments and the Treasury in 1841, it was finally decided to include the costs in the Colonial Estimates for the following year (CO 202/42: Stephen to Gordon 19.6.1841). This method of meeting the finances of Port Essington continued throughout its existence. Claims were made initially upon the Admiralty, who forwarded them to the Colonial Office and thence to the Treasury to be included in the Colonial Estimates for the ensuing year (Howard 1931–2:154–6).

In December the plans for the expedition were put into effect (RMAP Port Essington Correspondence: Barrow to Savage 8.12.1837, 15.12.1837, 16.12.1837) and on 19 February H.M.S. Alligator under the command of Bremer, together with H.M.S. Britomart commanded by Captain Owen Stanley R.N., sailed from England bound for Sydney and the Australian north coast.

CONCLUSION

From the existing evidence it is reasonable to conclude that the establishment of Port Essington was made as a political manoeuvre to preserve the British sovereignty of Australia, even though it was hung upon the façade of commercial enterprise. The Treasury certainly did not view it as a trading colony nor did several contemporary writers, who stated that it was to forestall the French (Drury 1858–9:87–91; Jukes 1847 I:184–5; Sweatman ML A.1725 II:253). Indeed, if it was solely a commercial enterprise, a number of points go unexplained. In 1838 the marines left England under secret orders (RMAP Port Essington Correspondence: Royal Marines Office to Dyer, dated only 4 March), and Bremer’s instructions expressly forbade him to encourage permanent settlers (Adm. 2/1695: Adam and Parker to Stanley 30.1.1838).

Throughout the history of the settlement, repeated requests to increase the garrison, and encourage land sales and occupation on favourable terms were refused. As well, Bremer’s selection of the site was a classically defensive one, situated 27 km from the mouth of the Port on the highest ground and commanding the narrow entrance to the inner harbour. Earl appears the only one to have recognised this point: ‘The inner harbour was selected on account of its superior capabilities for the erection of defensive works, the establishment having been formed as a naval station’ (Earl 1863:33).

In the final analysis, Bremer’s choice of location, as with Fort Dundas, was again to prove disastrous, firstly for the encouragement of trade, since many ships would not spend the several days required to work in and out of the harbour, but secondly because the health of the garrison continued to deteriorate because of the immediate environment and the prevalence of malaria in the settlement.