Chapter 7
H.M.S. Alligator sailed from England on 19 February 1838, arriving in South Australia on 10 July. After embarking additional marines (Adm. 53/88: Alligator’s log 20.7.1837 to 13.2.1843) the expedition arrived in Sydney on 21 July. The Governor of New South Wales had been instructed to render the party every assistance and Gipps readily complied, and throughout the subsequent history of the settlement remained convinced of its potential and the necessity for maintaining it. The transport Orontes was hired in August and the business of purchasing stores was begun. These included hard rations, clothing, eqquipment and trade goods (Adm. 53/88: Alligator’s log 20-7-1837 to 13.2.1843). In addition six frame houses were prefabricated for use in the settlement. The Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge donated a church in prefabricated form (Anon. 1843a:22-4) but the punt loading it in Sydney harbour sank, delaying departure until 17 September (The Sydney Monitor 7.9.1838).
To judge from the Sydney newspapers, the expedition created little excitement in Sydney. The Monitor (30.7.1838) reprinted a general article on the commercial aspects of the settlement which had appeared in the South Australian Gazette and Barnes wrote to the same paper wishing the expedition success (The Sydney Monitor 3.9.1838) but no other papers reported the expedition. However, Bremer’s long report to the Admiralty suggested that there was intense interest, and that under the terms of his instructions he had been forced to dissuade ‘several respectable persons’ from accompanying him. He stated that 50 tradesmen would have gone with him had he been able to make small grants of land, and he pressed the government to permit the occupation of land at Port Essington by grant or sale at a reasonable price. If such a move was adopted Bremer intimated that he himself would be a candidate for land there (CO 201/286: Bremer to Admiralty 16.9.1838, enclosed in Gipps to Normanby 27.5.1839). Leading Sydney merchants, while publicly wishing the expedition success in an undated letter to Bremer (ML A109: Riley Papers:113–4) appear never to have strenuously supported the settlement, although the trading schooner Essington accompanied the expedition to begin trading from the new post with the islands to the north and west. However, the idea of the settlement had had the support of several merchants in England (CO 201/264: Barrow to Stephen 11.9.1837; Howard 1931–2:101) and general interest had been aroused amongst Europeans in Rio de Janeiro on the voyage to Sydney (RGSA Earl Correspondence: Earl to Washington 1.5.1838). Thus, despite Earl’s remark that not a soul amongst the men appeared to care whether the expedition succeeded or not (RGSA Earl Correspondence: Earl to Washington 16.8.1838), their general reception in Sydney caused both Bremer and Earl, who had been employed as interpreter, to begin in high hopes.
After taking formal possession of Cape York on 20 October, the Alligator arrived at Port Essington on 27 October 1838. Despite Earl’s suggestion of Bowen Strait as a possible site, Bremer seems to have made up his mind as to the suitability of Port Essington and sailed there directly. Although Earl was later to suggest that Bremer’s instructions gave him no latitude in selecting the position for the settlement, in fact he was instructed to go to the neighbourhood of Port Essington and Raffles Bay ‘and cause both of these Places (as well as any others) to be thoroughly examined before you determine on either, and you may perhaps in the course of the examination find some other spot not far distant to which you may give a preference’ (Adm. 2/1695: Adam and Parker to Stanley 30.1.1838). The spot chosen was to have ‘a good and safe Anchorage, an easy communication of Shipping with the Shore, an abundant supply of fresh water, and a good soil; a Spot which is likewise easily defensible as well on the Sea as the Land side’. After several days examination of the Port, Bremer chose an area on the western side deep in the inner harbour. This choice suggests that Bremer paid attention more to the defensive side of his instructions than any other. There the settlement of Victoria, named in honour of the new monarch, rose on the plateau behind Adam Head on the highest large area of land on the shores of Port Essington. No fresh water was to be found in the immediate area, and the soil was no better than in a dozen other places in the harbour. But both Adam Head and Minto Head commanded the narrow entrance into the inner harbour, and behind the settlement the land sloped to the south and west so that any adversary might have to attack from a disadvantageous position. But the site was 27 km from the harbour mouth, unrelieved by the coastal breezes and difficult for quick access by ships under sail. In many respects it was to prove as disastrous a choice by Bremer as had been his initial choice of Melville Island 14 years before.
The subsequent history of Port Essington falls naturally into two distinct avenues of enquiry. Firstly, the internal history of the settlement illustrates the difficulties facing the men who tried to tame this strange, remote, tropical environment and the ways which they tried to do it. Superimposed upon this drama are the political manoeuvres of the statesmen who held the puppet-strings of Port Essington in another world. The former history is the focus of the present study and the latter has been dealt with elsewhere, especially by Howard (1931–2:106–61) and Graham (1967:428–43), but to understand the basic problems besetting the success of the settlement it is necessary to reiterate the outlines of the political background during the lifetime of Port Essington.
Bremer remained at Port Essington for six months, sailing from there to Sydney on 3 June 1839. During that period all things prospered (HDL In Letters B.803: Bremer to Beaufort 5.4.1839; Anon. 1843a:8-12). The land parties set to work clearing, building and laying out gardens. Earl had departed aboard the Essington almost immediately for the Serwatty Islands to procure fresh food with which they returned to Port Essington on 15 December (Earl 1846:47–52). The Essington then sailed again for Dili. Bremer himself sailed to Dili in February (Howard 1931–2:115–6) and the Britomart under the command of Captain Owen Stanley, sailed on 18 March for Timor Laut and the Kai and Aru Islands, returning on 15 April (Stokes 1846:438–75). All these voyages assisted in publicising the new settlement as well as supplying it with fresh provisions, and each account speaks optimistically of the possibilities of trade. But both Earl and Stanley had encountered the Dutch already in the islands, and Earl at least 112was aware of this threat to British commerce in the area. In a letter to Washington in the following year, Earl complained bitterly of the Dutch, who, he reported, had attacked Sandalwood Island (Sumba) possibly prompted by the settlement of Port Essington (RGSA Earl Correspondence: Earl to Washington 13.7.1840). Although tempered for publication in the Royal Geographical Society’s journal by a more reserved editor, Earl’s prose left no doubt of his own opinion, referring to the Dutch as ‘the great enemy of our commerce’ (altered to ‘our commercial rival’) who, he said, were behaving with their ‘usual cunning’ (changed to ‘ability’). Although the Society published some of Earl’s observations on Sumba, all references to Dutch aggression were completely omitted. Personal details of the settlement were also edited out so that first hand assessments that were being sent to England often did not reach public attention uncensored. This can be seen now only as a reflection of nineteenth century diplomacy and propriety, against which Earl seems often to have offended.
If Bremer anticipated that orders would await him in Sydney for the opening up of Port Essington to colonisation (Graham 1967:430) he was disappointed in this respect. However, he reported that interest was still high in Sydney, and upon receipt of an application to permit a Mr James Jones to go to Port Essington to cultivate sugar cane, Bremer wrote to Gipps enquiring whether he would be departing from the essence of his instructions to offer permissive occupancy at Port Essington. While Gipps could not accede to Jones’ application (CO 201/288: Bremer to Gipps 7.9.1839, Harington to Bremer 7.9.1839, both enclosed in Gipps to Normanby 20.11.1839), he was persuaded of the necessity to open the settlement if it was to have any chance of success, and on 11 September Bremer issued a notice to the effect that persons of respectability wishing to resort to Port Essington for the purposes of trade might apply to lease land at five shillings per half acre (CO 201/288: enclosed in Gipps to Normanby 20.11.1839). The conditions limited such grants to a period not exceeding seven years, with all improvements to be at the expense and risk of the lessee.
The conditions offered were not attractive, since they promised no government protection or permanency, and the rental was high, being only slightly less than the upset price of land in New South Wales at the time (12/- per acre). Bremer was forced to report that although the notice caused ‘considerable enquiry’ he was disappointed to find nobody willing to speculate under such conditions. He urged that Port Essington lands be thrown open for sale and that the garrison be increased (CO 201/313: Bremer to Admiralty 30.10.1839 in Barrow to Stephens 18.5.1841)
The sale of lands at Port Essington became a central problem throughout the lifetime of the settlement. From the Australian end it quickly became obvious that unless Port Essington could expand and attract the trade for which it had ostensibly been established it could not become economically self-sufficient. Thus Bremer, and his successor Captain John McArthur, repeatedly pressed for this action, and Gipps added his support to their request (HRA I xxiv:659-60).
By the time the first despatches from Port Essington reached England, Glenelg had been succeeded by Russell, who therefore viewed the question of the settlement in a more detached state than his predecessor, as one of the instigators of the plan, could have done. The Wakefield system of colonisation being to the fore, Russell referred the matter to the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners, asking them to assess whether the settlement might be sustained by the sale of lands in the area (CO 385/19: Stephen to Land and Emigration Commissioners 28.1.1840). Thus in 1840 and in subsequent years this body issued reports on the progress and prospects of Port Essington. The first report was exceedingly long and detailed (PPGB 1840 xxxiii 613:45-50). The Commissioners believed the port to be a good one as a refuge for shipwrecked sailors and quoted the large increases in shipping through Torres Strait that Bremer had reported in 1838 (CO 201/286: Bremer to Admiralty 18.9.1838), when 41 vessels had used Torres Strait compared with only 15 six years earlier. They also believed in the trading potential of the settlement, although they noted that the Macassans might not sell their cargoes of trepang because of Dutch controls at Macassar. On this point, however, they agreed that should this happen then the Chinese merchants would be likely to settle at Port Essington. The Commissioners viewed the strategic importance of the settlement as ‘an object worthy of the attention of the British Government, even at some cost to the country’. Finally they felt that not enough evidence was at hand to comment on the agricultural potential of the area. Thus they could not recommend that investors should be sought to finance agricultural development.
However, by comparing the sale of lands at Port Phillip and Adelaide, the Commissioners concluded that since the prospects for trade were so great at Port Essington, the land at this latter place could be valued at £1 per acre, and thus the disposal of lands there would net the Crown between £200,000 and £300,000. On this basis they recommended a Government advance of £25,000 to defray the preliminary expenses of setting out a town, the basic features of which they proceeded to outline in a most unrealistic manner. For example they suggested the sale of ‘town lands’ at £100 per acre, to be increased to £150 in the following year, and ‘rural lands’ in 80 acre lots at £1 per acre, to be increased after one year to £1.10.0., at a time when fertile land in temperate New South Wales was being sold at an upset price of 12/- per acre. It was not surprising that Russell declined to direct the Treasury to sanction this advance. However he agreed that survey work should be commenced on the township and proposed the appointment of an officer of engineers and men for the task (PPGB 1840 xxxiii 613:50).
While such suggestions could be made with ease, their implementation was a different matter and Stephen in a long minute attached to the Treasury’s directive to him to implement the proposed survey gave vent to his anger over the affair and his opposition to the Wakefield System in general (CO 201/303: Trevelyan to Stephen 17.6.1840). The Treasury had agreed to Russell’s proposal on the basis that the costs would be repaid out of the subsequent sale of lands. Somewhat hysterically, Stephen asked where the money was to come from since the men would have to be paid and have their passages paid from civil funds. Neither the British nor the New South Wales Treasuries had any money for such purposes, and only several days before no engineer could be found to send to Canada for a similar task. Stephen followed this with a blistering attack on those theorists who had given ‘currency and fashion to a most fallacious notion that what they call a self-supporting colony may be established by a Sale of Lands on a certain plan’. Stephen argued that Port Essington could be made to support itself in this way, if there were people simple enough to lend money for its support. But, Stephen claimed, this would be neither practical nor honest. Infant colonies had to be nursed and supported by the parent state (CO 201/303: Stephen to Gairdner, 26.6.1840, minute on Trevelyan to Stephen 17.6.1840). ‘It seems to me’, he later wrote, ‘that the occupation and colonisation of New Holland and the other islands of Australia is one of those vast schemes of national policy into which Great Britain has been drawn by the current of events and with little human foresight to direct us, but which like the peopling of North America and the conquest of India must be regarded as amongst the most impressive movements of divine providence in the 113government of this world’. In this scheme of things it was necessary to draw a belt of colonies around the Australian coast ‘to give us the absolute and undisputed possession of the interior … I am for planting out the French, the Dutch, the Americans and the Germans, and for keeping to ourselves a source of commercial and maritime greatness’ (CO 201/329: minute dated 11.1.1842 on Bremer to Stephen 2.1.1842).
Thus the political considerations which had established the British in north Australia continued to keep them there and as, one by one, the hopes for the success of the settlement diminished and died, the assumed political necessity of the settlement caused the post to linger. This is reflected in the succeeding reports of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners. Their report in 1843 reversed almost all their earlier opinions of Port Essington. The climate was unsuitable, only one shipwrecked crew had reached the port, no trade could be fostered with the Macassans, the place was out of the track of ships sailing between Sydney and Asia. Nevertheless they concluded, ‘we are aware that there are reasons of quite a different nature which have been urged for maintaining a post at Port Essington’ (PPGB 1843 xxix 621:12). In 1847 the Commissioners wrote, ‘notwithstanding that our inquiries had confirmed our impression that the settlement had failed to accomplish the direct ends for which it was projected, the place ought, nevertheless, not at present to be abandoned’ (PPGB 1847 xxxiii 809:10).
Russell was succeeded as Colonial Secretary in September 1841 by Lord Stanley. Despatches from Australia continued to suggest that Port Essington might yet prosper if traders could be attracted to the place, and Stanley asked the Colonial Land and Emigration Board to enquire to what extent the mercantile interests in England would be willing to support the settlement should it be placed on a permanent footing. Three months later the Commissioners were forced to report a total lack of interest (PPGB 1842 xxv 567:8) so that the question of a permanent settlement languished until the following November when the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, George Hope, suggested that emigration from the neighbouring islands might be encouraged (CO 201/320: minute dated 30.11.1842 on Gipps to Stanley 5.5.1842). The question was referred to the Colonial Land and Emigration Commission and their report came almost twelve months after Hope’s original suggestion (CO 386/61: Elliot to Lefevre to Stephen 14.11.1843). Meanwhile, and again at the suggestion of Hope, the papers relating to Port Essington had been presented in Parliament as a last resort to publicise the settlement, and these had elicited some response from traders in England (CO 201/340: Cummins to Stanley 5.4.1843) so that interest seemed sufficient to cause Stanley to review the question of permanent settlement.
The Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners had seen that the Land Sales Act of 1842, which required that waste lands could only be sold at the minimum upset price of £1 per acre, might well preclude the introduction of coloured settlers since they could not afford to buy the land. Instead they proposed that Port Essington might be constituted as a new colony and therefore outside of the statute governing the sale of lands in New South Wales.
Stanley decided that the settlement should continue on its impermanent basis and that it must remain an outpost of New South Wales, and hence subject to the Land Sales Act of 1842. Since the act provided for permissive occupancy on yearly leases, Stanley saw this as the way around the problem of immigration from the neighbouring islands and instructed Gipps to inform McArthur of his decision (CO 202/48: Stanley to Gipps 14.3.1844).
By the time the decision to try and sell lands at Port Essington reached McArthur, the tiny settlement had been in existence almost six years, during which time none of the benefits suggested by Earl and others had been reaped. According to Graham (1967:434) the bloom had departed from the settlement by 1842 and the wet season at the end of that year had brought a severe epidemic of malaria which resulted in the detachment having to be relieved by fresh marines. The struggle to stay alive in such a hostile environment depressed even the spirits of the staunch McArthur, who by this time felt himself neglected and ill-treated, isolated from his wife and children and surrounded by difficulties. ‘May God grant us both’, he wrote to James Macarthur in Sydney in June 1845, ‘hearts to understand His ways’ (ML A2922: Macarthur Papers 26:288–95)
Although McArthur received some enquiries from European settlers, nothing came of them (CO 201/359: McArthur to Hope 28.1.1844 in Gipps to Stanley 1.9.1845). He could not have been surprised at this since, two years earlier, he stated that unless favourable terms could be offered no speculators would take lands at Port Essington in preference to the temperate lands to the south (CO 201/330 McArthur to Stephen 20.9.1842). However, McArthur still entertained hopes that the Macassans might be persuaded to settle, and during the early part of 1845 he made particular efforts to attract them, showing them the inland areas most suitable for cultivation and discussed the rents with them, stating that they thought the terms most reasonable (CO 201/359: McArthur to Thompson 23.4.1845 in Gipps to Stanley 1.9.1845).
In addition McArthur notified Singapore of the opening up of the settlement to a ‘limited number of Chinese and Malays’. The conditions of occupation were liberal in the extreme, the rental for ‘country allotments’, those outside the immediate limits of the town, being one shilling per acre for the second year, following twelve months occupation gratis, and increasing to a maximum of three shillings after four years (CO 201/359: McArthur to Thompson 23.4.1845 in Gipps to Stanley 1.9.1845). But again this move failed to induce any settlers to come.
Howard (1931–2:132-3) has outlined a number of reasons for this lack of response: that the early history of the settlement had made would-be speculators dubious about the permanency of the post; that the poorer Malays could not reach Port Essington; and that the Dutch policy in the Archipelago was becoming less stringent. McArthur’s disappointment was reflected in his letters. To Colonel Owen he wrote ‘I am perfectly disappointed in the objects of this settlement. The Malays renew annually their payment of promises to come and settle here, but the same parties do not re-appear at all. I am not very much surprised at this. They are nothing doing in a mercantile way, and therefore are ignorant of any method of providing for themselves, everything connected with them, customs, habits, manners, knowledge has been with them like the laws of the Medes and Persians from the date perhaps that they were promulgated’ (RMAP Port Essington Correspondence: McArthur to Owen 23.5.1846).
From 1838 a ship of war was always stationed at Port Essington. This duty fell in turn to the Britomart, the Chamelion and the Royalist, but in the beginning of 1844 orders were received for the reduction of the Squadron in the Indian and China Seas to which the Port Essington vessels had been attached. Vice Admiral Parker ordered the Royalist to Hong Kong for a refit and thereafter Port Essington was left without a ship (Adm. 1/5539: Parker to Admiralty 10.4.1844).
Six years after the establishment of Port Essington, confusion existed as to who had authority over it. Sir Francis 114Cochrane, Parker’s successor as Commander-in-Chief of the East India Squadron, wrote to the Admiralty in August 1844 and again in July 1845 seeking information as to his responsibilities towards the settlement (Adm. 1/5548: Cochrane to Admiralty 21.7.1845). A minute on this letter dated four months later stated that Port Essington was altogether distinct from his command, the settlement being ‘under the Authority of the local Governor of Australia – that it is in all respects a Colony; subject to Colonial government; under the directions of H.M. Secretary of State for the Colonies’.
Thus without a ship, the settlement languished even more than before, dependent upon the Colonial transport which made an annual journey with supplies, and upon the traders who still occasionally visited the settlement. During the years 1846–1849, the Acting Pay and Quartermaster drew Bills of Exchange in favour of six traders, one from Singapore, two from Hong Kong, one from Dili, one from Surabaya, and one from Bali. All these transactions were made for food supplies, as far as they were recorded by George Lambrick, the settlement’s Quartermaster, and he noted in June 1848 that in the previous ten months there had only been a ‘few days’ supplies of fresh meat (AONSW 4784 Lambrick letter books: see esp. Lambrick to Ramsey 15.6.1848).
In England the problem of what to do with Port Essington passed into the hands of Gladstone upon his succession to the Colonial Office in December 1845. At this time the last hopes of attracting Macassan settlers had not passed, and Gladstone sought the advice of Bremer as to the settlement’s capabilities. In a detailed reply Bremer defended Port Essington strongly and maintained, as he had from the beginning, that the garrison should be increased if it was to attract anybody. Ships sailing from Sydney towards India could not be expected to delay their voyages to trade with a garrison of 60 men (CO 201/372: Bremer to Gladstone 17.2.1846).
Visitors to the settlement in its later years however were almost universal in their condemnation of the place. MacGillivray (1852 I:135–8) visited Port Essington in 1848, having been there three years before and was appalled by the ‘non-progressive nature of the system which had been established there’ stating that there was probably no vessel in Her Majesty’s navy in which the men were not better supplied with the necessaries and comforts of life than at Port Essington. Owen Stanley, Stokes, and Blackwood, all at different times engaged in survey work on the north Australian coast, condemned the settlement (Howard 1931-2:134).
Opposition to the settlement as it existed also came from an unexpected quarter, the Admiralty itself. Barrow had retired in 1845, and the following year the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of Ellenborough, wrote to Gladstone demanding that the marines be withdrawn from Port Essington (CO 201/370: Ellenborough to Gladstone 2.4.1846). Gladstone’s reply carried an edge of hostility to this volte face on the part of the Admiralty. ‘As far as I can ascertain’, he wrote, ‘the Settlement was originally projected by Sir J. Barrow and Capt. Beaufort, whose authority at the Admiralty seems to have led to the placing (of) a detachment of Marines on shore’ (CO 202/52: Gladstone to Ellenborough 2.5.1846). Although Gladstone admitted that there seemed little reason for maintaining the post if not as a naval base, he expressed the opinion that convicts might be placed there in the future, and felt himself not disposed to make a decision until he received a report from the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners. Ellenborough again wrote to Gladstone demanding the withdrawal of the marines, stating the irregularity of stationing these men in permanent garrisons in Australia (CO 201/370: Ellenborough to Gladstone 6.6.1846). Gladstone replied asking Ellenborough not to press the matter, since withdrawal of the marines would inevitably destroy the settlement (CO 202/52: Gladstone to Ellenborough 12.6.1846). Gladstone agreed however that the question of the provisional nature of the settlement must be settled, and waited for the report of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners, who began a full enquiry, taking evidence from Stokes, Blackwood, Crawfurd and Gipps (Howard 1931–2:138). Their report, eventually received in 1847 by Grey, who had succeeded Gladstone, reiterated the areas in which Port Essington had failed; Victoria was situated too far from the sea, and ships would not go out of their way to visit a port ‘where neither cargo nor intelligence is to be obtained’; as a place for shipwrecked crews the settlement was too far from Torres Strait; the expected trade with the Macassans had not transpired; tropical agriculture such as cotton could be grown more easily in other parts of the Empire (PPGB 1847 xxxiii 809:48 Appendix 10).
While all these disadvantages were patently true, they were merely the superficial reasons for the failure of the settlement. Earl’s scheme had been to establish a commercial emporium, a focus for European and local traders to bring their goods. Because of the manner in which the settlement was begun and administered in England speculators were precluded from going to Port Essington on terms that might have encouraged them. As Stephen had pointed out, this was the responsibility of the government, and in this the government had failed.
The Commissioners saw only two reasons for the continued maintenance of the post. Firstly it might be useful as a coaling station for steamships between Singapore and Sydney. Secondly, there was the possibility that if the coast were abandoned, foreign powers might be tempted to settle it. Thus the political considerations from which Port Essington had been born continued to breathe life into the ailing body.
However, the fear of foreign intervention in Australia had diminished over the decade of Port Essington’s existence. There was no evidence that the Dutch had any intention of colonising north Australia, and in 1843 Barrow had written to Stephen that the French were ‘quartering themselves on a different part of the Globe and may be satisfied with the large scope which the Pacific will afford them’ (CO 201/337: Barrow to Stephen 19.9.1843).
On receipt of the Commissioners’ findings James Stephen quickly dealt the coup de grâce to the argument of foreign intervention should the British withdraw. In a minute he wrote that no foreign Power could take possession of the area ‘without a manifest infringement of the rights of the British Crown, for the mere withdrawal of the marines would not be a repudiation of our rights of dominion’ (CO 201/389: minute of 23.1.1847 on Elliot, Wood and Rogers to Stephen 22.1.1847. Thus Stephen directly refuted the argument which Barrow had presented in favour of settling Melville Island, and later Port Essington. If this was Stephen’s opinion one wonders why he remained silent to Barrow’s argument nine years before, and in view of Stephen’s own statements on planting out the Dutch and French, it would seem likely he was aware of the diminished likelihood of any such thing happening by this time.
For the remainder of 1847 and 1848, Grey allowed the settlement to linger, until in February 1849 an enquiry was sent to the India and Australia Steam Packet Company as to whether they intended to utilise Port Essington as a port of call or a coaling station. The negative reply (CO 201/420 Yates to Hawes 21.2.1849) sealed the fate of the settlement and in June 1849 Grey communicated to Fitzroy, the Governor of New 115South Wales, his decision to abandon Port Essington (CO 202/56: Grey to Fitzroy 10.6.1849).
No evidence exists of McArthur’s feelings as he quit Port Essington after 11 years of futile work to try and make the place the success that King had envisaged 30 years before. If the settlement had failed, he at least had kept it going and the methods of his endeavour form the subject of the following chapter. 116